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FOREWORD
This monograph is the result of an integrated
research project conducted by a group of eight officers
at the U.S. Army War College during the 2017-2018
academic year. Three of the officers were international
fellows, and five were U.S. military special operations
officers with multiple tours of duty in Afghanistan.
Together they had more than 20 years of experience
working on various aspects of the complex problem
set facing the United States in Afghanistan before
arriving on campus. Significantly, while integrated
research projects are common, this project was the
first such endeavor ever to be generated at the student
level and then set in motion by the U.S. Army War College faculty, rather than vice versa. In addition to their
experience, the officers brought with them to Carlisle
Barracks, PA, an intense desire to put their knowledge
and lessons learned on paper and continue to push
ahead against the problems they faced in Afghanistan.
The group identified the four most important and
challenging issues which the Resolute Support mission grapples with on a daily basis: (1) maintaining the
equilibrium of power and control between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban at its current
level; (2) bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table
to begin peace talks with the Afghan Government;
(3) getting Pakistan to curb its 17-year support to the
Taliban; and, (4) start to roll back the pernicious dominance of opium production in the Afghan economy
and its corrosive influence on national governance
and state-building. Everyone involved in this project
was keenly aware that thousands of dedicated U.S.,
Afghan, and international personnel from the military,
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diplomatic, and academic spheres have been struggling with these same four issues for almost 2 decades.
The group’s intention was to enhance that ongoing
effort through academic research and the application of
the members’ experience in order to develop specific,
implementable solutions for each of the four problems.
The faculty tasked the group with avoiding both long
history lessons and the kind of vague bromides (i.e.,
“so-and-so must do more such-and-such”) which tend
to dominate external reviews of the challenges facing
Afghanistan but which are too nebulous to implement.
Some of the proposed lines of action are unconventional. Because this monograph is the product of
an international team of military officers, not all of
the views, analyses, and recommendations it contains
reflect U.S. Army or U.S. Government policy. Furthermore, because the officers divided themselves into
teams of two to address each of the four challenges discreetly, not all of the analyses and proposals reflect the
views of all eight of the participants. Given the task of
addressing these four persistent problems in Afghanistan with a wide-open aperture, and without the
restraints and constraints of current policy and lines
of action, the group responded with a blend of recommendations for both current operation improvements
and recommendations for new and sometimes unorthodox approaches. This monograph is the product of
a combined 8 academic years of research and analysis (not counting faculty engagement), and the set of
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proposals contained herein for enhancing the prospects for success in Afghanistan are indeed worthy of
further consideration and discussion.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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PREFACE
This monograph is the result of an integrated
research project conducted by a group of eight resident students at the U.S. Army War College in 2018.
The group was comprised of five U.S. special operations officers with experience in Afghanistan and
international fellows from Colombia, India, and
Afghanistan. This group brought a unique set of experiences to the challenging problems now pressing on
the nation-building effort in Afghanistan. The research
project took on the four most difficult problems confronting the international community in the ongoing
conflict for in-depth research and analysis. The problems themselves have long been identified and have
been the focus of concerted efforts by the United States
and our allies for 15 years:
1. The open border with Pakistan and crossborder sanctuary for Taliban forces.
2. The cultivation of opium poppies and its effects
on the Afghan Government, civil society, and
guerilla operations.
3. The challenge of creating and sustaining a capable state security architecture during an ongoing conflict.
4. Reducing the capabilities of a persistent and
confident enemy and getting to a negotiated
conflict resolution.
As these are already well known, the group was
directed away from either elaborating on descriptions
of these challenges or devoting much space in the core
paper to the history of these problems, as this would
add little to the literature already available. Rather, the
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researchers were charged with bringing their practical
experience and analysis to bear on developing solutions with the highest probability of success. A pair of
researchers addressed each of the four major problems,
and each of the four teams was tasked with producing
at least four detailed, actionable recommendations to
solve the problems. In addition to a short chapter for
each problem with its recommendations, the group
also created appendices detailing its research, sources,
and case studies.
The group was specifically directed to avoid the
usual, vague recommendations that everyone working
on the problems has seen and heard so often, such as
“Pakistan must do more” or “the Afghan Government
must eliminate corruption.” While certainly true, such
bromides do little to advance practical solutions to
stubborn problems, which have resisted the best efforts
of two generations of Americans. Within a year or two,
the first American Soldier or Marine will deploy for
duty in the Afghan conflict who was not born when
it began in October 2001. There is little which has not
been tried before.
The eight researchers studied what has been tried
and sought to draw out what worked and why. They
focused on realistic recommendations that were specific enough to be begun by this generation of soldiers and diplomats on the ground. Because this is the
product of military officers, many of the solutions that
emerged from their research are within the power of
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security forces in Afghanistan to test and implement.
However, as thousands of dedicated men and women
now focused on these persistent problems know only
too well, there are few silver bullets which will solve
these challenges overnight. The problems are unusually complex and often intertwined with each other,
and even vary from one region of Afghanistan to
another, such that what could work in one place might
not be as effective in another.
The man-years invested in analyzing the problems focused on by this project, guided by faculty
members with decades of experience in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, have yielded a valuable product for
discussion. This monograph provides some distilled
wisdom derived from the 17 hard years of struggle
that are already behind us to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan, and specific, sometimes “outsidethe-box” recommendations to improve the odds of
success there in the coming years. The authors believe
that these are valuable suggestions; if even one of these
suggestions is tested locally, found to enhance the
war effort, and could be implemented more broadly
with success, the prospects for peace and stability in
Afghanistan will be improved.

Dr. M. Chris Mason, Ph.D.
Group Faculty Advisor
July 10, 2018
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SUMMARY
The United States will soon enter the 18th year of
combat operations in Afghanistan. During that time,
multiple approaches to stabilize the country have been
tried, including support to regional security initiatives,
“nation-building,” counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and “train and equip.” The
constellation of anti-government elements known collectively as the Taliban continues to refuse reconciliation or a negotiated peace under the existing Afghan
constitution. There are few, if any, silver bullets, but
to optimize conditions for success, the United States
should continue to prioritize its efforts against the four
major challenges in Afghanistan and engage the recommended solutions herein for each:
1. The Pakistan problem—reducing the Taliban
cross-border sanctuary;
2. Decreasing opium profits and Taliban access to
them;
3. Improving and retaining Afghanistan’s security
forces and decimating Taliban cadres; and,
4. Widening the spectrum of options for reconciliation with the Taliban.
This monograph consists of four chapters that
address these challenges in order and suggests at least
four specific, implementable policy recommendations
for each one. Appendices are provided which summarize research, sources, and case studies. This monograph is the result of an integrated research project
completed in 2018 which had a unique mix of senior
military contributors, including two brigadier generals from South Asia, a colonel from Colombia with
extensive experience against the Revolutionary Armed
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Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (“FARC” in Spanish), and five U.S. special operations officers with multiple tours of duty in Afghanistan. The project advisor
was Dr. M. Chris Mason, an Afghanistan specialist
since 2001.
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INTRODUCTION
FOUR KEY FACTORS FOR THE FUTURE
OF AFGHANISTAN
The United States will soon enter the 18th year of
combat operations in Afghanistan. The original mission to topple the Taliban and establish an interim
Afghan Government was accomplished within the
first 12 months of the war, but mistakes were made
and stability remained elusive. In the years following the 2001 Bonn Conference in Germany, multiple approaches emerged which included support to
regional security, “nation-building,” counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and creating an Afghan national security architecture from
scratch. A mixture of these approaches remains in
place today. Meanwhile, the Taliban continue to make
minor tactical and territorial gains using a “death of
a thousand cuts” approach to sapping Afghan Government security forces and their morale. Battlefield
losses and the shrinkage of the security forces through
persistently high annual attrition suggest the patient
Taliban adage of “you have the watches, but we have
the time” is working via the classic guerilla tactic of
seemingly random, scattered attacks against weak
police checkpoints and minor army positions all over
the country. It is a well-known principle of counterinsurgency that “if you are not winning, you are losing.”
To reverse this sense of Taliban confidence in victory
and the slow, creeping erosion of government control of the rural areas, it is critical to first establish a
true military standoff, defined as a situation in which
no significant Taliban military action can be taken or

1

territorial progress made. Few would suggest that this
is the case today, or that the Taliban lack confidence in
their gradualist strategy of attrition.
To optimize the opportunities for success going
forward, it is broadly agreed that the United States
should continue to focus strategic efforts against four
key challenges. First, reducing the cross-border Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan should be the highest priority of the U.S. effort. Second, incremental improvement
in efforts to decrease poppy production and its corrosive effects on Afghan society at all levels is essential
if Afghanistan is ever to move out of the narco-state
shadow. This problem has frustrated planners for 15
years, and it is time to try new approaches and reinforce points of past success. Third, these approaches
have to be reinforced by increasing and improving
Afghanistan’s military capacities and the effectiveness
of current targeting priorities. Taliban foot soldiers
and tactical leaders are easily replaced, but village
and district cadres are less so. Fourth, new and unpalatable approaches to a negotiated end to the conflict
must be considered, as the war seems unlikely to end
on our terms.
The chapters in this monograph analyze these
efforts and offer four concrete, implementable recommendations for improvement in each one. The integrated research project which led to this monograph
was conducted by a unique mix of senior military officers. It was centered on two brigadier generals from
South Asia and a colonel from Colombia with decades
of experience against the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia-People’s Army (“FARC” in Spanish).
The group also included two colonels and three lieutenant colonels in U.S. special operations with extensive experience in Afghanistan. Worth noting is the
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unanimous consensus of the research group that, for
the United States to be successful in Afghanistan, the
effort will take a commitment of decades. There are no
short-term fixes and few silver bullets.
The layout of this monograph consists of four
chapters which address the challenges in order, each
concluding with specific policy recommendations.
Appendices are included which summarize research
and case studies. This approach allows the reader to
scan for the main points and use the appendices to
access underlying research and data in greater detail.
Every strategy has prioritized efforts. The four wellknown challenges with recommended approaches
described herein should remain as the priority considerations for leaders and planners supporting the
Afghanistan mission. The views and recommendations contained in this monograph and any factual
mistakes it may inadvertently contain are entirely the
responsibility of the monograph editor.
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CHAPTER 1. RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR REDUCING CROSS-BORDER
TALIBAN SUPPORT
It has been well-understood for more than a
decade that Pakistani support for the Taliban guerrillas and poor control of Afghanistan’s borders plague
the stabilization effort. The goals of finding a means of
addressing Pakistan’s support to the Taliban and other
violent extremist organizations, improving border
control between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and securing the cooperation of other regional states remain
elusive, despite 17 years of effort. Reducing crossborder support for the Taliban in Pakistan would
require a harder assessment of the factors in Pakistan
that support the insurgency and a willingness to “take
the gloves off,” so to speak. Everything that has been
tried since 2001 has failed to change Pakistani behavior, and more repetition of the same talking points will
not have the desired effect.
PAKISTANI SUPPORT
“External sanctuary and support is a decisive
factor in determining the outcome of an insurgency.”1
As Steve Coll notes in his recent history of Pakistani
support to the Taliban, Directorate S, Western military
strategists and planners in Afghanistan have known
for a decade that no insurgent movement since World
War II which had cross-border sanctuary and support,
as the Taliban does, has ever lost its fight against its
government.2 There is no longer any debate that the
Taliban in Afghanistan obtains sanctuary in Pakistan,
as well as financial, logistical, military, and medical
support from the Pakistani Government.3 Pakistan’s
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policy of waging war through terrorist groups is
planned, coordinated, and conducted by the Pakistani
Army.4 To curtail the external support to the insurgency in Afghanistan, it would be necessary to alter
the behavior of the Pakistani Army, and this, in turn,
requires an honest appraisal of its true overall aims
and intents. There remains some serious misunderstanding of both in Washington.
“Pakistan’s Army sees itself as the defender and
protector of the ideology of Pakistan.”5 It has, over
time, consolidated its hold over the governance of
Pakistan by linking this primary task to an imaginary
existential threat from India and by creating a nexus
with the “custodians of Islam.”6 Pakistan’s overall
grand strategy—and its domestic audience’s definition of victory, for all intents and purposes—is to
maintain strategic parity with India.7 In other words,
Pakistan’s definition of victory is not being attacked
by a country which has no intention of attacking it. In
effect, India not invading is mission accomplished. But
to make this mission credible, the illusion of India as
an existential threat must be maintained in the public
mind, and the Pakistani Army follows several wellcrafted strategies to sustain the illusion. Herein lies the
dilemma: Pakistan is a country, not a nation. In fact,
it is four different nations―Baluchistan, Sind, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, and Punjab—each with its own
distinct language, ethnicity, and culture. Enormous
centrifugal forces threaten to pull these four nations
apart, as they did when the former fifth nation, Bangladesh, spun off in 1972 and became independent. The
only things holding this fragile construct together are
(1) the weak inertia of day-to-day life, (2) the security
state (which violently suppresses nationalist activity
via extrajudicial killings), (3) an increasingly strident
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brand of Islamism (via support for terrorist groups),
and (4) the imaginary threat of invasion and conquest
by India. Removing any of the legs of this four-legged
stool would destabilize the cohesion of Pakistan—and
at least two of the four legs act directly against the
Government of Afghanistan and U.S. interests there.
This is why 17 years of U.S. persuasion and diplomacy seeking change in Pakistan’s policy of destabilizing and controlling Afghanistan were fruitless.
Such a change is not only in opposition to Pakistani
foreign policy interests, but it would also seriously
threaten the fragile cohesion of the conglomerate of
the four nations that make up the Pakistani state. U.S.
diplomats who sought to persuade Pakistan that support for terrorism was against Pakistan’s long-term
interests were wrong. Support for terrorism is part of
what keeps Pakistan together as a country. Therefore,
the only lever long enough to change this fundamentally Pakistani calculus would be one which posed a
greater threat to Pakistani state cohesion than removal
of one of the four legs of the stool (i.e., applying a type
of pressure which constitutes a greater danger than
maintaining the status quo).
The first element of the Pakistani strategy to maintain the status quo is its position on Kashmir. Kashmir
for Pakistan is not a territorial dispute, but an ideological one.8 Viewed from that perspective, Kashmir
can be understood as a symbolic cause celebre to be
maintained for political purposes, rather than an unresolved dispute over a specific piece of land. Kashmir
maintains the fiction of India as the boogeyman. If it
was not Kashmir, it would be something else. It is this
symbol of Kashmir which assists the Pakistani Army
in propagating its unifying narrative to its domestic
audience—i.e., that India is an evil, existential threat.
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This explains why international efforts to resolve the
Kashmir dispute have failed. It is a priceless issue as
a rallying cry and Pakistan does not really want it
resolved.
The second element of its strategy is the Pakistani
Army’s use of radical Islamists as part of the state glue
holding the country together, as proxies to sustain its
ideological war, and to maintain its hegemony over the
Pakistani state.9 The “Pakistan problem” has always
been how to dismantle these two mutually supporting narratives that ensure the primacy of the Pakistani
Army as a political force. Diminishing the dominance
of the Pakistani Army, in turn, would allow civil society to grow normally and curtail the power of the
various Islamist groups which it supports; however,
as noted, it would also likely dissolve the weak glue
holding Pakistan’s four nations together, or at least the
Pakistani Army believes it would, which amounts to
the same thing.
In support of these two elements of the Pakistani
Army strategy to remain in de facto power and preserve what is left of the map of Pakistan created by Ali
Jinnah in 1947, there exists a vast network of foundations, businesses, and organizations built by the Pakistani Army over the years to provide it with leverage
over political and economic institutions.10 Real estate
ownership by the Pakistani Army, for example, gives
it significant political capital in a feudal society. The
sprawling economic network which underpins the
Pakistani Army and provides jobs and income for
tens of thousands of retired officers, as well as cover
for covert operations, would have to be heavily modified in order for civilian democratic, political, and economic institutions to develop normally and become
more relevant. This is also unlikely to occur. There is
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far too much money and power at stake. The United
States can and will continue to demand concrete
political-military reforms from the Pakistani Government.11 After 17 years of doing this without any appreciable progress or genuine cooperation, however, this
is largely understood in Washington now—as it was
not a decade ago—to be a fool’s errand (i.e., a task
or activity that has no hope of success). But as Archimedes said, “give me a lever long enough . . . and I
can move the world.”12 Simply put, the United States
needs a much longer lever.
Furthermore, U.S. influence over Pakistan in mid2018 is at its lowest point in history. Military aid has
been suspended, and Pakistan is turning increasingly
to its “all-weather friend,” China, which is conveniently sympathetic and ready to backfill any shortages of equipment and money in the form of strategic
loans. Pakistan has not learned yet that everything that
comes from China has strings attached, as Sri Lanka
recently learned at the cost of its sovereignty over the
Hambantota port. Because of this, changing Pakistani
behavior and policy through bilateral diplomacy and
the usual “carrots and sticks” is less likely to happen
now than at any point since the U.S. chapter of the war
in Afghanistan began.
THE AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN BORDER
The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is,
at best, for most of its length, porous and ill-defined.
The border, stretched across the United States, would
run from New York to St. Louis, MO. Thousands of
trails and footpaths cross the border; it is literally
non-existent for hundreds of miles in places. For more
than a century, this border has been hypothetically
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delineated by the Durand Line. The British Government of the Victorian period drew a line on the map in
1893 that was revised slightly by multiple treaties over
the subsequent years.13 However, to date, this border
has not been officially recognized by either the Pakistani or the Afghan Governments. According to Vinay
Kaura:
The new border, dubbed the Durand Line, divided the
Pashtun tribal lands in two. Half of the Pashtun tribal
region became part of British India, and the other half
remained as part of Afghanistan. The boundary has
since been viewed with utter contempt and resentment
by Pashtuns on both sides of the line, which also causes
Afghanistan to lose the province of Baluchistan, depriving
the country of its historic access to the Arabian Sea.14

This lack of a defined, mutually accepted border
not only exacerbates the problem of sanctuary for
insurgents but also permits a lack of defined responsibility for control by either the Afghan or Pakistani
Governments. If there is no demarcated border, it is
impossible to enforce one. A great deal has been written on the “whys” of not being able to solidify a recognized border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
However, the salient point of this border issue is the
value of it to long-range strategic plans. It would be
difficult to control the border if one existed, but it is
impossible to do so without one.
There are two major negative outcomes that are
by-products of having no agreed-upon international
border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The first
is, as noted, the lack of defined areas of responsibility, artillery duels over contested segments, and the
consequent impacts on Afghan security. The second
negative outcome is the benefit to both countries’
smugglers and gray or black market economies; all of
10

these profit from the status quo, thereby significantly
reducing Afghan Government tax and tariff revenues.
In regard to the first of these, Dr. M. Chris Mason’s
study of counterinsurgencies noted that, since World
War II, in more than 50 case studies, no government
has defeated an insurgency where there has been an
external, cross-border, insurgent sanctuary.15 Recent
U.S. military history in Vietnam, where both North
Vietnamese regulars and Viet Cong (VC) guerrillas
had freedom of maneuver and sanctuary in Cambodia and Laos as they came and went from North Vietnam into South Vietnam, illustrates this sine qua non
of foreign internal conflict.16 Insurgents will always
take advantage of areas that are lacking in security
and that offer sanctuary; making porous borders more
of an advantage to an insurgent when the counterinsurgent has no authority to cross into other countries’
geographical space.
In regard to the second, the lack of a defined border
also degrades the Afghan and Pakistani Governments’
ability to optimize control of trade and commerce
for badly needed tariff and tax revenues. According
to Arwin Rawhi (former adviser to the Parwan Governor), for example, “to import power―for which
demand is skyrocketing in Pakistan―from Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan, Pakistan has to rely on Afghanistan.”17
Both governments are missing economic opportunities and financial revenues, because of poor border
control over the flow of goods and resources, and the
collection of taxes.
Analysts point out that the elaborate fences, rivers,
and roads between Mexico and the United States are
insufficient to secure that border, even when its location is mutually agreed upon and accepted. However,
the illegal immigration and drug smuggling problems
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between the United States and Mexico would be much
worse without these border controls. Police forces on
both sides of the border use these controls to focus and
coordinate border security operations, but, between
Afghanistan and Pakistan, in most places, there is
nothing at all.18
REGIONAL STATES
The problem of the spread of fundamentalist
extremism and narcotics from Afghanistan to its
neighbors is obviously a major concern for all of the
neighboring countries in the region. These countries thus have an obvious stake in controlling these
problems. As China expands its global footprint and
its “One Belt, One Road” network, for example, stability in Afghanistan is increasingly important for
enhancing its reach and influence. Narcotics flowing
through Iran destabilizes that country and causes
domestic health problems, as some of the opium inevitably stays inside Iran. The Central Asian Republics
and India seek to both gain greater reciprocal access
to each other and mitigate the corrosive social effects
of extremism and narcotics on their own populations.
India is in alignment with U.S. policy on the elimination of terrorism from the region, and could become
a greater ally to the United States in Afghanistan via
access to ports for increased trade, sales of India’s
Russian-built helicopters, and intelligence sharing in
support of Afghan counterinsurgency efforts.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 1
The United States has few partners in the region
that are fully aligned with all of its interests in Afghanistan, but all of the regional countries do have some
specific self-interests which coincide. Focusing the
aperture down onto very specific concerns and initiatives rather than broader bromides about “regional
cooperation” is the key. Chief among these is China’s concern about narcotics flowing into China from
Afghanistan and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism
in its predominantly Muslim western Uighur region.
With this shared interest in mind, the United States
should engage with China to a much greater degree
to moderate Pakistani behavior. Pakistan calls China
its “all-weather friend,” and, although it maintains as
low a profile as possible, China’s influence on Pakistan is far greater than is generally recognized. China’s chief interest in Pakistan for the last 10 years has
been its potential to be part of its sprawling “One Belt,
One Road” economic transit network via improved
roads through the Karakoram to the massive Chinese-built port at Gwadar. However, now that China
has taken territorial sovereignty over a significant part
of Sri Lanka’s port facility at Hambantota, Gwadar has
been somewhat reduced in importance.19 The downsides of narcotics and Islamic extremism flowing into
western China partially counterbalance China’s interest in gaining hegemony over Pakistan’s Gwadar port
and limited overland transit potential. At this point,
with U.S.-Pakistan relations at a low ebb, focusing on
China-Pakistan relations are the only real possibility of
applying diplomatic leverage on Pakistan. Seventeen
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years of direct U.S. engagement with Pakistan have
produced no discernable effect on Pakistani support
for the Taliban, and the United States itself has few, if
any, overt diplomatic cards left on the table.
Recommendation 2
The current approach to Afghanistan calls on India
to play an enhanced role in stabilizing the country.
India is cautious about provoking Pakistan’s bellicose
high command, but, again, there is little to lose in terms
of Pakistani behavior. The ongoing effort to encourage
India to increase further its engagement with Afghanistan should be intensified. Pakistan will undoubtedly
try its best to create a wedge in the U.S.-India relationship, but India in the coming years is a better option
for the United States to partner with to bring peace
and stability to the region than Pakistan. The United
States needs India’s influence and reputation, not
only in Afghanistan but also in Iran and the Central
Asian Republics. It is fully and finally past time to dehyphenate India-Pakistan policy.
Recommendation 3
It is also past time to take the gloves off in regard
to Pakistan’s support to the Taliban insurgency
in Afghanistan. Why should Pakistan be permitted to continue this egregious sabotage of international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan with complete
impunity? Why should this be consequence-free for
Pakistan? As this chapter has pointed out, only the
introduction of risk to Pakistan’s state cohesion will
ever change its behavior. Pakistan’s ongoing support for the Taliban in Afghanistan must be stopped
if the U.S. effort there is to succeed. It is past time to
14

introduce reciprocity in kind: The United States and
Afghanistan should begin to provide sanctuary and
non-lethal support to the 70-year old Baluchistan
independence movement inside Pakistan’s restive
western province. Baluchistan, an independent country in 1947, was invaded and illegally occupied by the
Pakistani Army in 1948, and the Baluch people have
sought to regain their independence ever since. They
have endured brutal repression by the Pakistani state,
including the use of napalm on Baluch villages and the
abduction and extra-judicial killing of thousands of
Baluch by the Pakistani secret police. Above all, Pakistan fears another independence movement similar to
Bangladesh; thus, this is perhaps the pressure point
that could change Pakistani behavior. The United
States and Afghanistan have the necessary assets in
place in Kandahar province to retaliate for Pakistani
support to the Taliban in kind. When Pakistan learns
that two can play their favorite “double game”20 and
that the potential internal consequences to the Pakistani state outweigh the potential external benefits of
continued support to the Taliban, then its behavior
will change.
Recommendation 4
Solving the Afghanistan and Pakistan border dispute should be a major diplomatic initiative if there is
to be long-term stability in the future. It has been said
that we have not been in Afghanistan for 17 years; we
have been in Afghanistan for 1 year 17 times. It is necessary to look beyond the “closest wolf to the sled” and
invest in long-term solutions to the border problem
that may not bear fruit for a decade, but are essential
if peace and stability are ever going to be permanent.
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The mindset of “victory during my 12-month tour
of duty” must give way to longer perspectives and
a commitment to long-term efforts that will take
decades to accomplish. Foremost among these is the
resolution and demarcation of a recognized, international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. A
defined border should be a major diplomatic initiative
and engineering effort, and moved now from the “too
hard” category to the “let’s get started now” category.
Until there is a border, and Pakistan respects that
border, U.S. efforts in Afghanistan are the equivalent
of pouring water into a leaky bucket.
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CHAPTER 2. RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR REDUCING THE OPIUM TRADE
While much of the country is mountainous and
arid, Afghanistan is capable of producing highquality wheat, cotton, lumber, saffron, and grapes.
However, overshadowing legal crops, poppy production in Afghanistan is now supplying over 90 percent
of the opium in the world’s heroin market (see figure
2-1).1 The effect of this is that “the drug trade has
undermined virtually every aspect of the Government
of Afghanistan’s drive to build political stability, economic growth, and [the] rule of law.”2 Narcotics also
provide an important funding stream to the Taliban,
although the extent of this funding and the degree to
which its absence would impact the viability of the
Taliban insurgency is the subject of some controversy.
Nevertheless, the reduction of opium production in
Afghanistan remains an essential goal of any security
strategy.3

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

Figure 2-1. Opium Cultivation and Production of
Opium, 1998-20164
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This chapter will suggest new or modified
approaches for tackling this epidemic.5 Specifically, this chapter will propose four recommended
approaches, which Afghanistan and the supporting multinational coalition can potentially employ to
buy time for the Afghan Government’s growth and
stabilization.
By one estimate, as of 2017, as much as 60 percent
(US$100-300 million) of the Taliban’s annual income
was believed to come from the distribution of narcotics.6 Other estimates have suggested a lower figure,
and analysts largely agree that other funding sources
would be found to replace it so that the insurgency
would not be seriously reduced by the complete eradication of the opium trade in the long term. In other
words, eradicating the entire poppy crop would not
end the Taliban insurgency. Because of the corrosive
effects of narcotics on civil society and the security
forces, which suffer from drug use and corruption
in their ranks (an excellent example of how these
four problems are interconnected), counternarcotics remains a necessary but insufficient condition for
long-term stability. Yes, eradication would destroy the
livelihood of a large percentage of Afghanistan’s subsistence farmers.7 Nevertheless, Afghanistan cannot
be permitted to continue to produce 90 percent of
the world’s opium simply because a few hundred
thousand poor farmers want to grow it. Having said
that, wiping out poppy cultivation rapidly, even if
it were possible, would create a humanitarian crisis
and put severe political stress on the fragile Afghan
Government. This conundrum has led to the current
understanding that: (1) eradication must be gradual and accompanied by comprehensive “seeds-tomarket-stall” crop substitution efforts; and, (2) while
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long-term solutions are being developed, the drug
trade today is best interdicted post-cultivation without inflicting economic harm on the noncombatant
farmers, who currently have no economic alternatives
to growing the crop (see figure 2-2). All of this, too,
has been well-understood for many years.

Figure 2-2. Afghan Farmer Net Income Potential
(1 hectare = 2.5 acres)8
In November 2017, Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT tried a different approach and “launched its
first counter-narcotics military offensive to deprive
the resurgent Taliban of its largest source of funding.”9 According to General John Nicholson, “we hit
the labs where they turn poppy into heroin [and] their
storage facilities where they keep their final product, where they stockpile their money and their command and control.”10 However, analysts indicate that
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opium producers quickly adjusted to the possibility
of lab destruction by limiting the amount of money
and opium on hand at any given time at any one lab.
Furthermore, labs can be replaced quickly at a fairly
low cost, or even made mobile, to avoid detection and
destruction. Blowing them up is a “whack-a-mole”
exercise. Nevertheless, the targeting of opium convoys and drug labs has a harassment value analogous
to artillery harassment fires, if nothing else, and it
increases the risk for drug producers and puts some
pressure on their operations. For this reason alone, it is
well worth continuing, but, alone, it might solve only
5 percent of the problem.
In addition to lab targeting, it is essential to
improve border security cooperation with neighboring countries to interdict the flow of narcotics (see
figure 2-3). This is one of the specific areas of concern
mentioned in chapter 1 of this volume. To enforce
the security of Afghan borders, it is understood that
improved border infrastructure, better border police,
and increased patrols at border checkpoints are necessary.11 More effective cross-border cooperation is
also needed to choke drug trafficking routes along the
porous Afghan borders to the north, south, and west.
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Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

Figure 2-3. Main Opiate Trafficking Flows,
2011-201512
RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 1
The United States should create an international
counternarcotics coordination center or fusion center
in Kabul, Afghanistan, to facilitate cross-border cooperation. Afghanistan’s neighbors share the concern
about the toxic effect of narcotics flowing out of the
country. Greater cooperation among them would
improve the efficiency of regional counternarcotics efforts by enhancing cooperation and intelligence
sharing among the ministries of interior, counternarcotics forces, and border police of participating countries. Each regional country, including Iran, should be
invited to post counternarcotics agents at the coordination or fusion center.
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Recommendation 2
The United States should further increase support
to the Afghan Border Police by providing more training, mentoring, infrastructure improvements, and
equipment. Training should focus on the application
of locally sustainable technologies and capabilities
for locating and apprehending traffickers.13 Hi-tech
solutions, which break down or require high literacy
levels in rural areas, have proven to be ineffective. A
very small corps of well-paid special agents similar to
Elliot Ness’s “Untouchables,” who operated in a similar environment of pervasive corruption in the United
States in the late 1920s, needs to be created from
Afghanistan’s best counternarcotics men.
Recommendation 3
Before the 1930s, a quarter of all trees in the United
States were American chestnuts. A blight accidentally
brought into the country from Asia wiped them all out
in a decade. The blight affects no other living organism, and continues to this day to prevent the growth
of new American chestnut trees. A similar organism kills only Dutch Elm trees, and it is harmless to
all other living things. For over a decade, the United
Nations has supported research into the bioengineering of poppy-destroying organisms, hoping to find
a variant harmless to the environment, people, and
legal crops in proximity to the poppy.14 However, due
to the lack of adequate funding and scientific effort, a
poppy-destroying organism has not yet been found.15
This actually is a silver bullet. We recommend that
the United States and its European partners significantly increase funding for ongoing research into an
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environmentally safe organism that would be bio-engineered to destroy only poppy plants and leave other
agricultural products unharmed. This would permanently solve the opium problem and would be a complete game-changer in Afghanistan. A fraction of the
US$8.5 billion wasted so far on counternarcotics (only
to see narcotics production triple in 15 years) would
go a long way in scientific research, and would enable
the United States to lead a massive research effort to
develop a solution to the narcotics problem.16
Recommendation 4
The United States should take a new, direct, and
more culturally effective approach to strategic messaging to educate and influence the rural poppy
grower. U.S. efforts to influence the rural Afghan population since the war began have been haphazard and
largely ineffective due to a lack of cultural knowledge
and a persistent pattern of simply transliterating U.S.created messages into Pashto and Dari, disregarding
the fact that such Western-created messages make
little or no sense in the Afghan cultural context. The
most effective approach to such messaging, according to Afghan scholars, would be Afghan-created
messages with an emphasis on the religious taboo of
narcotics production. The United States could not do
this directly, for obvious reasons, but the Afghan Government could and should. Rural Afghans are deeply
religious, and their daily lives are infused with religious sensibilities. Rural mullahs, for example, are
routinely consulted to ascertain whether a decision or
policy is Islamic—i.e., in keeping with Islamic principles and tenets. The Taliban’s engagement of religious
values as motivation for its movement, in contrast,
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is all-pervasive. There is no reason why the Afghan
Government cannot also invoke religion and religious obligations in the same manner in coordination
with Kabul’s Ulema. Indeed, this is being done now
to promote peace talks; why not also counternarcotics? Afghan-designed messaging via radio, television,
billboards, public schools, and social media, created
in cooperation with legitimate and credible national
religious authorities, should stress the un-Islamic
nature of drug cultivation and production in order to
create social pressure against growing and harvesting
poppies.17
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CHAPTER 3. RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR IMPROVING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL
DEFENSE SECURITY FORCES
Current negative strength, recruiting trends, and
combat losses in the Afghanistan National Defense
Security Forces (ANDSF) are vital concerns, which
future planning by Afghan and Resolute Support (RS)
leaders should address.1 In May 2017, a new 4-year
ANDSF “Road Map” plan was initiated by President
Ashraf Ghani to “continue to increase the capabilities
of the ANDSF, secure major population centers, and
incentivize the Taliban insurgency to reconcile with
the Afghan government.”2 This plan includes senior
leader changes and significant force structure realignment that will need to be executed in a “no growth”
environment, which has heightened preexisting tension between the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the
Ministry of Defense (MOD).3
As part of the Road Map plan, the MOD and the
MOI have undergone significant changes in leadership and structure. Realignment of Afghan Border
Patrol (ABP) and Afghan National Civil Order Police
(ANCOP) forces to the MOD, MOD structural modifications, and the formation of new “Territorial” forces
are examples of these changes. Senior leader dismissals to disrupt the status quo, reduce corruption, and
remove poor performers have increased. For example,
both the Defense Minister and the Afghan National
Army Chief of Staff resigned in April 2017 after the
deadly Taliban attack on Camp Shaheen, an Afghan
base in Balkh province where more than 140 Afghan
security personnel were killed. In addition, between
May and December 2017, 16 senior MOI officials were
replaced—including the top three: the MOI, the First
Deputy Minister, and the Deputy Minister of Security.4
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These aggressive changes can be linked to the current
National Defense Authorization Act, which requires
the United States to consider accountability and corruption within the Afghan MOD and MOI in order for
U.S. funding to continue.5 Against the positive outcomes of these personnel changes must be weighed
the chaotic effect of senior leadership turnover; the
resulting loss of continuity in ongoing programs; and,
the departure of experienced civilian personnel from
the ministries, as the new senior leaders replace the
former leaders’ relatives and friends with their own.
This turnover percolates down through all levels
of ministerial operations. By the time the personnel
structure has stabilized again, another round of senior
leadership changes typically occurs. This is known as
the Golden Gate effect, named after the painting of the
bridge in the San Francisco Bay, which, as soon as it
reaches the end of the bridge, begins again at the starting point. This state of perpetual change is sustainable
in the professional U.S. military, but is very disruptive
in the Afghan military, where nepotism, functional
illiteracy, and ethnic distrust are pervasive.
Proposed changes to the alignment of the Afghan
defense structure also include the formation of
National Joint and Regional Commands as well as a
realignment of sub-commands. The final design and
implementation of these efforts is incomplete, but
the Afghan security apparatus’ ability to achieve the
necessary level of proficiency and effectiveness in
an increasingly downward-trending security environment is doubtful. As currently designed and
employed, the lynchpin of security remains Afghan
National Army (ANA) and National Police capability
and capacity, which need to be assessed from the perspective of their strength and attrition.
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ANDSF Strength
In addition to the changes in senior leadership in
the security ministries mentioned earlier, leadership
changes at the ANA operational level have also been
significant. In 2016 and 2017, President Ghani relieved
or replaced four of the six ANA Corps commanders.
In addition, at least 162 Army generals were “retired”
in April 2017 because they “had all reached the retirement age of 60 and some had served in Afghanistan’s military for as long as 40 years.”6 It remains a
top-heavy army. While these changes suggest positive efforts toward improved leadership, significant
ANA manpower challenges remain. A steady decline
in force size driven by attrition, which has remained
above 30 percent per year for 16 years, has resulted in
a decade of force shrinkage. This challenge is magnified by the inability of RS to confirm Afghan information. “Coalition advisors rely heavily on the ANDSF’s
reporting because of their lack of visibility. With the
exception of Afghan special operations and aviation
units, U.S. advisors have little or no direct contact with
ANDSF units below ANA corps and Afghan National
Police (ANP) zone-headquarters levels.”7 The potential for “ghost soldiers and police” is enormous.
RS’s ability to validate current ANA and ANP
force strength and to maintain accurate strength and
attrition reporting remains elusive. The Combined
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan continues
efforts to implement automated systems to address
problems in personnel and pay accountability, but
such “new programs” have been a regular, recurring feature of every Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)/RS rotation for almost 15 years, and they
remain a work in progress.8 The ubiquitous OEF/RS
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response to inquiries about problems—“we have a
new program in place to fix that”—has become a sarcastic phrase among analysts and journalists covering
the ANDSF. The new staff officers and programs come
and go; the problems remain.
To complicate the external and independent evaluation of ANDSF force posture and capacity further,
“RS classification [guidance] has restricted the public
release of the exact, assigned (actual) and authorized
(goal) force strength and attrition data for the ANDSF
as a whole, as well as each force element individually (ANA, ANP, Afghan Air Force [AAF], etc.), with
the exceptions of the Afghan Local Police (ALP).”9
A classified annex now contains that information, so
estimates included herein are based on prior reporting and trend analysis. As the Taliban are known to
have spies and agents, willing or coerced, in virtually
every security element in Afghanistan (who are regularly reporting back manpower strength to their Taliban handlers outside the bases), the Taliban almost
certainly has the most accurate and reliable ANDSF
strength statistics in Afghanistan, so this “security
measure” only hampers us.
Unsustainable attrition and casualty rates, coupled
with recruiting challenges for the ANA over the last
5 years, indicate that the current (now-classified) figures are unlikely to have improved and, in fact, are
still trending downward.10 The October 2017 Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
report, which provides the most recent official ANDSF
strength (ANA, AAF, and ANP) reporting from RS
sources, indicates an overall decrease by approximately 6,000 men between July and September 2017.11
Statistical analysis by monograph editor Dr. M. Chris
Mason at the U.S. Army War College indicates that the
ANA has actually shrunk in size by an average of 1,000
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men per month every month for the last 3 years. In
every measurement provided in the last RS-reported
strength chart estimations in October 2017, every
ANDSF component (ANA, AAF, and ANP) is smaller
than it was at the beginning or end of 2014. According
to these figures, since the ANDSF took responsibility
for security in 2015, only the ANA has shown a slight
increase (approximately 300 personnel), even while
overall ANDSF strength remains smaller. Research
and analysis of desertions, recruitment, recruit dropout rates, ghost soldiering, combat casualties (missing,
wounded, or killed in action), and non-combat (accidental) losses since 2002 suggest that the true number
of ANA men present for duty in August 2018 is well
under 100,000 men. Official strengths of the Afghan
Corps and below, as well as all components of the
police (ABP, ANCOP, etc.), are now classified.
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Source: Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR).

Figure 3-1. ANDSF Force Strength12
Reported ALP strength numbers remain just below
30,000, but verification is not possible.13 Again, the
potential for fraud is enormous. No one knows how
many of these men are actually physically present
for duty and armed. Their effectiveness against wellarmed and experienced Taliban guerrillas is questionable in any case, as is their impact on local support
for the Kabul government. Plans to increase the size
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of the ALP force and professionalize training remain
topics of discussion, but with the United States as the
sole source of funding and the expiration of congressional approval in September 2018, current planning
is focused on whether to maintain the ALP or to transition as much of the force as possible into an existing
Afghan organization with ANP control and oversight.14 Of the 11 specialized police programs under
MOI control initiated by the United States after 2005
(including the Afghan National Auxiliary Police, the
Afghan Public Protection Program, and the ALP),
only the ALP continues to operate today.15 Continued
reports of ALP corruption and abuse as well as a lack
of integration into the ANP remain unanswered and
pose serious challenges for the future of the ALP.16
Instead, the best option would be to transfer these
men into the new Territorial Army forces in order to
provide some measure of MOD visibility, logistics,
medical support, accountability, and leadership. As
it stands, the ANP has very limited, if any, military
value, and the current bifurcation of security forces
between the MOI and MOD—with their inherent lack
of unity of command and unity of effort—has plagued
security operations for 15 years. Incorporating the ALP
into the ANP would only perpetuate this fractured
security architecture, and would constitute a loss of
valuable manpower which could instead enhance the
Territorial Army.
ANDSF ATTRITION
Unclassified reporting from July 2017 by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
indicates an average 2.3-percent monthly attrition
rate across the ANA (including the AAF, Special
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Operations Forces, basic trainees, and students), or
approximately 28 percent annually.17 This number
may be an underestimate. On average, the ANA loses
one-third of its members to attrition every year, and
the ANP loses one-fifth, rates that have garnered
attention and concern from U.S. and international military and civilian leadership for many years.18 ANP
attrition remained, on average, above 2 percent for the
July 2017 reporting period.19 In addition to desertions,
combat casualties remain at alarming levels. An article
in August 2017 stated: “on an average day, 31 members of the Afghan national [defense] security forces
are killed, according to data from official sources.”20 In
2018, losses on many days exceeded 100 men killed in
action per day.
ALP casualty rates from RS (specifically, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Component Command) are not available because “advisors to the ALP staff-directorate level in Kabul do not
track retention, attrition, or losses.”21 However, 2015
International Crisis Group reporting shows that “in
2014, an ALP officer was three to six times more likely
to be killed on duty than his ANDSF counterpart.”22
Whether this is due to a lack of training, a lack of
equipment, or a lack of support from the ANP or the
ANA in extremis (or some combination of those factors) is debatable, but the results are disastrous, and
the losses are unsustainable.
Attrition most severely impacts the noncommissioned officer corps and junior-ranking enlisted soldiers, undermining efforts to develop a trained and
experienced cadre of soldiers and officers.23 This trend
is mirrored in declining Afghan Government district
control, while the number of insurgent-controlled and
-influenced districts has incrementally increased.24 In
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May 2017, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats
warned that conditions in Afghanistan “will almost
certainly deteriorate” in 2018, even with a modest
increase in U.S. support.25 High attrition rates and the
loss of more government-controlled territory have
continued in 2018. The hidden, potentially fatal flaw
in the manpower problem is declining recruit potential. For whatever reason, virtually 100 percent of
security force recruits come from the rural areas. As
Taliban control of the rural areas increases, the pool
of potential recruits decreases correspondingly. A
Najibullah-style status quo in which the government
controls the urban areas and the guerrillas control
the rural areas is unsustainable because government
access to recruits to replace desertions and combat
casualties would be limited. Force size may soon reach
a crossover point at which continuing declines become
irreversible. Thus, a major effort to reduce desertions
and promote the retention of existing soldiers must be
initiated immediately. Guaranteed retirement benefits
in the form of land grants or a government-subsidized
Hajj and retention benefits such as greater reenlistment
bonuses, pay increases, or other creative, Afghancentric incentives need to be dramatically increased.
Continuing to lose one-third of the force every year in
a shrinking recruit environment is setting the stage for
a manpower crisis. If we cannot increase the number
of recruits, we have to retain the soldiers we already
have more effectively.
SECURITY ARCHITECTURE REALIGNMENT
Coalition efforts to consistently build and project power and security across Afghanistan from a
national, centralized government continue to fail.

37

Tribal affiliations and locally based allegiances with
no military backup in extremis and low levels of reliability, equipment, and training continue to erode
support for the government in the rural areas, where
Taliban forces can mass and strike weak, local units
opposed to Taliban rule. Recognizing this dilemma,
multiple efforts (Village Stability Operations, Afghan
Public Protection Program, etc.) have been made to
incorporate or develop security at the local level.
However, with:
limited oversight from, and accountability to the Afghan
government and the United States, [many of] these police
forces were reported to have engaged in human rights
abuses, drug trafficking, and other corrupt activities,
ultimately serving as a net detractor from security
[emphasis added].26

In fact, according to Dr. Mason at the U.S. Army War
College:
There have been at least nine failed efforts by the U.S.
military to establish irregular forces in Afghanistan since
. . . November 2001. . . . What these programs all had in
common—besides failure, getting a lot of people killed,
and adding nothing to Afghan security—was that all of
the forces created were notionally under the control of the
Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs, which Afghanistan’s
own President calls the ‘heart of corruption.’27

There are two related efforts emerging in Afghanistan today which attempt to address the challenge
of building local forces that are willing (and able)
to fight locally against the Taliban and other threats
(e.g., Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS]), but which
have national backing and oversight and, more importantly, the ability to request and receive required support from the ANA or other government forces when

38

necessary. One of these, referred to as the Peoples’
Uprising Force (PUF), are groups of Afghan villagers
who arm themselves in order to resist the Taliban and
maintain the security of their villages.
It is not a new concept, and has been a “doubleedged sword” since the beginning of the war in 2001.
Most often, funding, training, and equipment are
received by PUF (or militia) elements through coalition or Afghan national support networks in order to
maximize a:
calculated but clumsy strategy of misaligned state
patrons mobilizing old mujahedin networks against the
Taliban—a counterinsurgent strategy and a final gasp
before US forces left the province to its own devices.28

Locally organized, irregular armed forces have
always been a vital component of successful counterinsurgency. No regular police or military force can
be large enough to be in every village in sufficient
strength all the time. Whether they are a net security
positive or a net security negative, however, depends
on how they are organized and led. Their presence in
Achin District, Nangarhar Province, in October 2017,
for example, is said to have “halted the ISIS encroachment into their territory with savage fighting long
before regular Afghan army units or US forces arrived
to help them.”29 In contrast, on the other side of the
country, in Faryab Province, five districts fell to the
Taliban after ANP and PUF were overrun. Pajhwok
Afghan News reported, “A public uprising group commander said all areas of the district had fallen into the
hands of the militants” when ANA support did not
arrive.30
The PUFs clearly have a limited ability to hold
their districts against the Taliban on their own after
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their districts have been “cleared” by coalition or ANA
forces. The PUFs are more of a tripwire than a barrier; they require closely coordinated military support
from a vertically integrated command structure that
is responsive and reliable in order to survive. Without this element, recruitment, retention, reliability,
and morale will be low. The challenge presented by
these militia forces is two-fold: first, providing rapid
military assistance to the PUF when it is necessary to
prevent it from being overrun and destroyed; and,
second, maintaining its allegiance to Kabul and not to
local strongmen who will use the PUF to exploit and
thus alienate the local population. The solution to both
challenges is vertical integration into the MOD. The
U.S. Army learned this lesson in Vietnam, where the
Regional Forces and Provincial Forces were integrated
into the South Vietnamese Army and came under the
command of the local South Vietnamese Army battalion commander.
It is important to recognize the political limits
of such irregulars, however. They have no sense of
national identity or a national cause. Dr. Mason states
that the “‘People’s Uprising Forces’ is something of a
misnomer.” They are not a national (popular) movement. They are angry locals responding to local power
struggles, often tribally based, usually competing for
advantage in local village economies, and focused on
local issues like land and water rights. Carter Malkasian’s book on the war in Helmand province, War
Comes to Garmsir, expertly documents this. “They
care nothing about the central government in Kabul,
or even their nearest provincial government,” Mason
says.31 The “ink blot” theory of counterinsurgency
does not apply: the irregulars are not pro-government;
they are simply anti-Taliban. A striking example of
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this was seen in July 2015 when Vice President Abdul
Dostum’s so-called “uprising forces” were accused
of “rape, extortion, arbitrary arrests, and theft” after
securing villages in Faryab—the sort of accusations
that continue to roil the Afghan Government as of
August 2018.32
As a result, the second emerging effort in the security sector is a new MOD-led effort to establish an
irregular defense force with ANA oversight, training,
and support—the Afghan Territorial Army (ATA).
The model for such a territorial force is the old Afghan
Army from the 1930s to the early 1970s, when the
king was overthrown and the current civil war began.
This is how Afghan armies were organized before the
Communist period. Afghan military leaders understood the nature of their own people and knew that
they needed to serve close to their homes. “The need
for creating such force was born out of the experience
of [Afghans] fighting largely on their own since 2014,
with American troops reduced to a small advisory
role.”33 More importantly, the maxim that “all resistance in an insurgency is local” demands a locally
focused irregular, territorial, or provisional approach
that is vertically integrated into the national security
apparatus. As Dr. Mason notes,
irregular forces which are not vertically integrated into
the ANA force structure will continue to be slaughtered
by the Taliban as they are now. If they are not vertically
integrated into the ANA, the ANA does nothing to help
them.34

Afghan Defense Ministry spokesman Dawalt
Waziri announced the creation of this “new militia
force” in February 2018, stressed that “the new force
will work under the direct command and control of the
defense ministry,” and stated that the “recruitments
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will be made from Afghan Government-controlled
areas where they ultimately will be deployed after
undergoing military training.”35 The size of the force is
not confirmed, but it is estimated to exceed 20,000, to
be based on the Indian Territorial Army model, and to
have active ANA leadership installed at the local level
to oversee training as well as provide direct linkage
to the ANA in case of need.36 Perhaps the component
most critical in this effort that was lacking in so many
failed efforts before will be the “vertical integration”
of this force directly into the MOD. Time will be the
final indicator of success, but “the new approach of
putting the latest iteration of irregular forces under
MOD control is a step in the right direction.”37 The
successful precedent for such a force is the Regional
Forces-Provincial Forces model in South Vietnam,
which ultimately inflicted about 40 percent of all casualties suffered by the Viet Cong (VC) during the Vietnam War.
In addition to the ATA development within the
MOD, “The process of transferring the [ABP] from
MOI to MOD control has nearly been completed, and
the transfer for the [ANCOP] to MOD control is ongoing.”38 Only a small number of ABP will remain under
the MOI to maintain customs and border crossing
responsibilities. Much like the ATA vertical integration, this shift to the MOD will better utilize the ABP
within the ANA Corps regions and provide the possibility of better coordination and synchronization.
Redirection of Targeting
In addition to this much-needed realignment and
rationalization of the security architecture, a similar
broad revision of kinetic targeting is necessary. “Clear
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and sweep” operations—currently being conducted
solely by the Afghanistan Commandos with U.S.
Special Forces Advisors—have repeatedly proven to
be little more than harassment to the Taliban forces,
which simply merge into the local population during
the operation and flow back into control once government forces are beyond visual range. We have
consistently overestimated the ability of Afghan Government forces to retain control of the “swept” areas
after the departure of U.S. firepower. We have also
consistently underestimated the ability of the Taliban
to replace ground force losses, as we did in Vietnam.
We have been killing Taliban for 17 years, and there
are more on the battlefield today than there were 17
years ago, just as we killed the North Vietnamese regulars and VC for 8 years in Vietnam, and there were
more on the battlefield in 1970 than there were in
1962. Neither the enemy in Vietnam nor the enemy in
Afghanistan can be forced to negotiations by attrition.
Both are (or were) highly ideologically motivated, and
both have (or had) the ability to replace combat losses
at a far higher rate than the United States could inflict
them. Conventional operations over the past 17 years
have focused on killing enemy forces and temporarily clearing areas of Taliban fighters with less of an
emphasis on targeting the underlying Taliban infrastructure. This is ineffectual and needs to change.
The Taliban infrastructure, like the VC cadres in
the Vietnam War, consists of “underground bureaucratic structures with functional elements devoted to
intelligence and counterintelligence, media and propaganda, finances, recruitment, and religious affairs.”39
In actuality, these interconnected, local cadres sustain
and enhance the national Taliban’s military efforts
directed from the Quetta Shura. A targeted shift to a
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highly detailed understanding and mapping of the
Taliban infrastructure, combined with a relentless
dismantlement of its infrastructure, can be conducted
through anti-infrastructure forces in conjunction with
populace control.
The U.S. Army learned important lessons in Vietnam that can be applied now. During the conflict in
Vietnam, the United States established Provincial
Reconnaissance Units (PRUs), which were designed
to target the similar Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI)
through the compilation of coordinated intelligence
and direct elimination. The VCI consisted of a communist-supported network of cadres and agents who
lived undercover among the rural population. The
PRUs were a joint effort between the U.S. military, the
Central Intelligence Agency, and Vietnamese intelligence officers.40 The intent was to conduct “a large
countrywide counterintelligence effort involved in
counterespionage and counter-subversion activities” through the capture and/or elimination of VCI
leaders.41 In comparison to modern-day tactics, the
VCI’s approach to the task was similar to the targeting cycle known as F3EA: find, fix, finish, exploit, and
analyze.42
The PRUs were a conglomerate of indigenous and
U.S. intelligence experts that mapped out the VCI
through document and material exploitation, interrogation, and repetitive interaction with the local populace. Coined the “Census/Grievance and Aspiration
Program,” the PRUs interviewed all men and women
within their areas of responsibility.43 This method
opened the door to intelligence collection, as the program allowed an accurate account of who belonged in
the villages, what issues the people were having, and
what expectations the people had of the government.
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As the intelligence became actionable, assault teams
(combined U.S. and Vietnamese soldiers) were used
to target VCI leadership. This line of operation, which
was dubbed “Operation PHOENIX,” received significant negative (and exaggerated) publicity, but the
historical record is clear that it was by far the most
successful, effective, and enemy-feared counterinsurgency program in South Vietnam.
One of the most valuable tools of the PRUs against
the VC cadres were the “Kit Carson Scouts” (Chiêu
Hồi or Hồi Chánh Viên), who resulted from the flipping or “rallying” of VC members. Former VC who
now chose to serve the South Vietnamese Government
were dubbed Kit Carson Scouts and attached to operational PRUs and other elite forces, such as the South
Vietnamese Rangers. The scouts were invaluable as
their information expanded the existing networks, led
the teams directly to VC supporters, uncovered tunnels, and located VC supply caches. The development
of the scouts had a snowballing effect: as more VC
were identified and captured, more were rallied to the
government side. That this proved extremely effective can be seen in intelligence reports in the National
Archives. The Anti-Infrastructure Operations reporting of 1970, for example, states: “6,405 [VC] were sentenced, 7,745 were rallied, 8,191 were killed in action,
and 10,689 were captured.”44 Despite the scouts’ exceptional record of success in Vietnam, no similar groups
have been formed in Afghanistan in the past 17 years.
The Afghan intelligence agency (the National
Directorate of Security [NDS]) is tasked with intelligence collecting, arresting collaborators and members
of the Taliban, and conducting several counterinsurgency operations, with limited success. The NDS is a
linear descendent of the Khadamat-e Etela at-e Dawlati,
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also known as the Afghan Secret Police, who were
trained by the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti
(KGB). See appendix II of this volume for more information. As an intelligence organization at the district
level, the NDS has limited direct presence and capability. At the provincial level, NDS has an organization
of varying size and competence with varying numbers
of armed operators. To begin to dismantle Taliban
cadres, the NDS would need to be augmented with
highly reliable, trained operators (an asset in short
supply, but also of low priority for development).
However, experience shows that a priority of effort in
this dimension with a specific focus on dismantling the
Taliban infrastructure could potentially “reverse [the]
insurgents’ unprecedented territorial gains.”45 The
extent of unity of effort and command, however, in
an interagency counterinsurgency task force “empowered to establish objectives, set priorities, and direct
operations”46 would be directly proportional to its
success. Additionally, this organization must “protect
populations from the insurgent’s coercive methods,
pursue social and economic development to eliminate
root causes, and mobilize populations to support the
counterinsurgency.”47
RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 1
The U.S. military should dissolve the ALP and
encourage or incentivize its members to transition
into the ATA, where they can be socially accountable,
administratively counted, logistically supported, and
properly led. The legacy of the ALP, for all of its good
intentions and all the years of effort by U.S. special
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operations forces, is unrepairable, unmanageable, and
unaccountable. As such, ALP will continue to both
challenge and embarrass the government in Kabul.
Unity of command, unity of effort, and vertical integration of security forces under the Afghan MOD are
major steps in the right direction toward redesigning
the security architecture, which was originally created
for a country at peace.
Recommendation 2
The United States should assign active-duty ANA
officers to leadership positions within the realigned
ABP and the new ATA. These assignments would be
critical to the new organization’s success, support,
and accountability. These assignments are the only
way to hardwire the units to the ANA, ensure vertical integration with higher headquarters, and fulfill
lower-echelon needs for logistical and combat support.
Furthermore, the MOD should never lose sight of the
“territorial” aspect of the Territorial Army. This is the
old, pre-1975 way of creating and manning the Afghan
Army (i.e., men from a province stay and fight for their
own province), so the Afghans should need little mentoring in this regard. However, attention needs to be
paid to ethnic and tribal allegiances in the assignment
of ANA officers to the territorial forces. Outsiders will
be less likely to be respected or obeyed; on the other
hand, tribal rivalries within a province have to be carefully managed. In other words, existing and historical
associations and social ties within the geographical
region should be the priority basis of assignment for
eligible officers in order to enable effective unit loyalty
and stability operations; however, one tribe must not
be allowed to dominate a unit and victimize or exploit
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other local elements. Allowing one tribe to control a
unit would naturally disintegrate the force or, worse,
it could add to regional instability and violence rather
than improve it, and open the door for the Taliban to
“save the people” from the territorial forces.
Recommendation 3
A more effective counterinsurgency approach that
employs the successful lessons of historical experience
and proven-effective programs targeting guerrilla
infrastructure rather than military forces is critical.
The targeting of Taliban military forces “scratches
an itch” but does little to reduce Taliban presence or
morale, as Taliban foot soldiers and field commanders
are easily and quickly replaced. The United States has
been targeting and eliminating Taliban military forces
for 17 years, and there are more Taliban combatants
in the field today than at any time during that period.
Afghan Pashtun male population growth vastly
exceeds the rate at which the Taliban can be killed,
meaning, as it did in Vietnam, that a war of attrition
will fail because the enemy will always have recruits
at its disposal. On the other hand, the PRU antiinfrastructure force in South Vietnam proved highly
successful in dismantling the underlying guerilla
support network upon which the foot soldiers relied.
Information in U.S. archives indisputably shows that
the VC feared the Phoenix program, which dramatically sapped cadre morale and threatened the entire
VC infrastructure in South Vietnam with widespread
defections and desertions. This lesson learned should
not be forgotten.
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Recommendation 4
A major new effort to reduce desertions and promote the retention of existing soldiers must be initiated
immediately. Culturally effective retirement benefits
in the form of land grants or a government-subsidized
Hajj after the completion of 20 years of good service
should be offered. In addition, durable reenlistment
incentives (such as paying one-fourth of a reenlistment
bonus every 3 months, versus a lump sum payment,
which soldiers could take up front and then desert)
should also be offered. Quality-of-life improvements
for second-enlistment soldiers; across-the-board pay
increases; cash valor awards; and, other creative,
Afghan-centric forms of compensation should be instituted or dramatically increased. Continuing to lose
one-third of the force every year in a shrinking recruit
environment is setting the stage for a manpower crisis
in a few years’ time.
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CHAPTER 4. RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR MOVING TOWARD RECONCILIATION
“The objective of the campaign is to convince the
Taliban that they cannot win on the battlefield. The war
will end in a comprehensive, Afghan-led political settlement that will include all parties, including the Taliban.”1 The U.S. goal, as outlined in the recent report
to Congress, is a “stable, independent Afghanistan at
peace with its neighbors,” with political reconciliation
as the flagship of the strategy.2 The report emphasizes
how increased tactical success against the Taliban
will, in theory, deny them victory and force them to
a negotiated settlement. A settlement involving reconciliation and reintegration is not a new idea but, since
2005, all efforts to bring the Taliban to the negotiating
table to discuss peace have failed. U.S. naiveté about
the Taliban’s intentions in discussions have resulted in
embarrassments on at least three occasions. Numerous surveys, prisoner interrogations, and reliable field
reports show that the Taliban are convinced that they
eventually will win the current conflict. Battlefield
successes throughout 2018 have done little to convince
the Taliban of the need to negotiate. At present, they
control more territory than at any time since 2001, with
complete or near-complete suzerainty over as much as
40 percent of the rural areas of Afghanistan. The Taliban now control a population larger than Belgium’s,
and this area is slowly increasing. The major cities and
predominantly Dari- and Turkic-speaking provinces
in northern Afghanistan are the exception, underlining the ethnic nature of what is, for all intents and purposes, a civil war.3 Herein lies the contradiction—the
Taliban are certain they are winning militarily with no
incentive to negotiate, while the United States follows
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a strategy centered on forcing the enemy to the peace
table through military pressure.
This chapter will briefly review previous Afghan
reconciliation efforts to date and make several recommendations based on those efforts for increasing the
likelihood of success. This monograph makes a distinction between formal reconciliation, which the Afghan
Government and the West desire, and acceptance of a
status quo. Acceptance of a kind of military standoff
which tacitly accepts Taliban de facto control across
much of the country might be relatively peaceful, but
it is not reconciliation. Rather, this type of peace is
best described as “accommodation” brought about by
a military balance.4 The term “stalemate” should not
be used—a stalemate is a position in chess in which a
player must move, but cannot do so without moving
into check, which is illegal in chess. Therefore, it is
technically a draw. That is not analogous to any outcome in Afghanistan, as the United States and the Taliban will always be able to make moves. The correct
term would be “standoff.”
A BRIEF HISTORY OF RECONCILIATION
EFFORTS 1978 TO PRESENT
A study of Afghan reconciliation efforts since
1978 reveals a pattern of futility and Taliban gamesmanship in which the guerrillas have demonstrated a
singleness of purpose and an adroit ability to manipulate Western diplomats to their benefit. The Taliban
and the West are operating in two completely different cultural worlds. The West persists in absurdly
viewing the Taliban through a Western political lens,
while the Taliban appear to understand the West far
more clearly (and reject it). Afghan tribal leaders,
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rarely consulted, probably understand the dynamic
better than even the dysfunctional Afghan Government does. Former British diplomat Michael Semple
observes, “The legacy of reconciliation in Afghanistan
includes traditions drawn upon all eras and pursued
as statecraft by previous administrations.”5 He states,
“given the country’s long history of internal and external conflict, the pursuit of reconciliation can be said to
be integral to Afghan statecraft and [the] local practice
of war” and the “institutions invoked during traditional reconciliation are a core part of Afghan cultural
heritage.”6 It is, therefore, of considerable importance
to understand these traditional approaches, as Western cultural paradigms are not working.
The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) Reconciliation (1978 to 1992)
During this period, the communist party PDPA
sought United Nations (UN) mediation and tried a
host of reconciliatory approaches to gain cease-fires
intended primarily to support a solution leading
to Soviet withdrawal. Initially, the non-aggression
pacts were supplemented with financial and logistical support, which permitted the local mujahideen
commanders to be in charge of security in their own
areas as long as they did not attack Soviet forces or
Soviet-backed Afghan security forces.7 These agreements were unsuccessful during the peak of the conflict because the mujahideen leaders simply used the
government support to increase their power and consolidate their positions without any intention of keeping the peace over the long term or of reconciling with
the government. In essence, the Soviets were in a cage
with a lion, and their strategy was to feed the lion.
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Afghan President Najibullah Ahmadzai pursued reconciliation “relentlessly” during his reign, but got few
takers as long as the “Soviets still had troops in the
country.”8 This is quite similar to the Taliban position
today—there will be no reconciliation as long as foreign forces are in the country. By the late 1980s, when
the Soviets had withdrawn, Najibullah attempted to
incorporate the mujahideen into a post-Soviet Afghanistan via power-sharing, but he relied heavily on cash
subsidies from the Soviets to pay the mujahideen not
to fight the government.9 In the lion in the cage analogy, when the Soviet Union collapsed and the subsidy
payments (i.e., the food) dried up, the lion ate Najibullah. Similar payments to the Taliban today not to fight
would not be a credible option for the same reason.
The Bonn Accords and the Loya Jirga (2001 to 2003)
Reconciliation efforts after the Taliban was
defeated in 2001 were a litany of poor decisions, hubris,
squandered opportunities, bad advice from would-be
experts, and cultural tone-deafness. These failures to
grasp opportunities for stability ranged from: refusing
multiple Taliban surrender offers; forcing the elimination of the Afghan king as a beloved figurehead of
national unity, similar to the Queen of England and
the Emperor of Japan; Central Intelligence Agency
meddling that established warlords in power; and,
creating an unworkable constitution which ensconced
democracy and a theoretically powerful central government (which had no real power at all) in a country
which has never had either democracy nor a strong
central government. Consequently, these failures
to grasp opportunities for stability set the resulting
Afghan Government up for failure. These failures also
set up the return of the Taliban to Afghanistan, similar
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to the way that the Versailles Treaty set up the rise to
power of the Nazis in Germany.
The earliest refusal by the United States and the
Afghan Government to accept a formal Taliban surrender came when the Taliban Supreme Leader,
Mullah Omar, sought to negotiate:
In December 2001, with the movement in full collapse,
Mullah Omar publicly offered to surrender the Taliban’s
stronghold, Kandahar, to Afghan tribal leaders. Soon
after the Taliban fell, a brother of a top Mujahideen figure
aligned with al Qaeda, Jalaluddin Haqqani, participated
in consultations with Afghan government patrons in
Khost, a subtle indication that the family was seeking
entrée into the new Afghanistan. It was only after these
overtures led nowhere that the family’s network joined
the insurgency.10

As Fotini Christia and Michael Semple point out,
there were numerous, similar scenarios involving
senior Taliban figures seeking inclusion in the new
Afghan Government, including “Sahib Rohullah
Wakil, the head of the Salafi movement in eastern
Afghanistan.”11 The early period from October 2001
to early 2002 was full of missed opportunity from a
willing and defeated opponent. The Bonn Conference
was another missed opportunity. While reconciliation
was mentioned in the Bonn Accords, the Taliban were
not even participants in what was considered a peace
agreement, an indication of American hubris. By 2005
and into 2006, many experts, such as Thomas Waldman, assessed that “leaving the Taliban out of Bonn
was a big mistake.”12
In June 2002, the Loya Jirga in Kabul selected
the new Parliament members. Several senior Taliban leaders sought positions within the new government and even attended the Loya Jirga, despite the
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awkward position many found themselves in after
being excluded from Bonn. Many others chose to stay
in traditional Pashtun-dominated regions aligned with
their tribal affiliations to reassume their old places in
those hierarchies before the rise of the Taliban. During
this period, Hamid Karzai “publicly left the door open
to the possibility of the Taliban playing a role in the
government.”13
But the Northern Alliance warlords sought individual opportunities to advance their own power
and settle old grievances, and they made it clear to
the senior Taliban leadership, mid-level Taliban commanders, and rank-and-file fighters that there was
no room for them in the new Afghanistan. For most
young, rank-and-file Taliban soldiers and low-level
commanders accustomed to the prestige and respect
accorded to Taliban mujahideen in Afghan culture, this
meant returning to a lowly peacetime social status in
traditional tribal power structures where social standing was derived largely from seniority and in which
they were again essentially peons.14 For them, it was
a fall from the top of the social totem pole to the very
bottom. To the former mid-level Taliban commanders,
mostly former mujahideen, who might have expected
a modicum of respect in the new Afghanistan, Karzai’s
December 2001 declaration of amnesty and his public
appeal seemed hollow and lacked credibility. Senior
Taliban leaders, shut out from the Bonn Accords and
excluded from the new Afghanistan, went south and—
with extensive help and support from the Pakistani
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)—gradually reformed
their network in northern Pakistan. There they began,
again with the active support of ISI, to plot a return
to power through the classic stages of a Maoist model
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of people’s war. Warning signs of incipient insurgency
were dismissed or ignored.15
In 2005, the Afghan Government initiated the
Afghanistan National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission by Presidential decree, to be
headed by Sebghatullah Mojadedi (a respected former
1990s mujahideen leader), who would administer a
new group of reconciliation programs.16 The main
effort was the Proceayee Tahqeem Solha or “strengthening peace program,” better known by its Dari acronym
as PTS. The thrust of the PTS effort was to “certify
that former insurgents are living peacefully and have
accepted the new constitution.”17 The PTS program
was crippled from the start by lack of resources, low
credibility, the inability to protect reconciled insurgents carrying their certificates from harassment,
bureaucratic corruption, and little or no effective management. The program yielded dismal results. Disillusioned and destitute former Taliban returned to
their former networks with accounts of broken promises, disrespect from Tajiks, and abject poverty and
near-starvation at the hands of corrupt government
functionaries.
Neo-Taliban Movement Efforts (2006 to 2011)
The weak and under-resourced reconciliation programs, growing Pashtun disenfranchisement with a
Northern Alliance-dominated government, loss of
the Afghan king, Karzai’s lack of tribal credibility and
legitimacy, unemployment, and a lack of economic
progress in the rural areas further fomented the Pashtun insurgency. The most significant reconciliation
effort occurred in 2007 in Musa Qala (Helmand province). While there are conflicting accounts of what
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happened at Musa Qala, it is clear that the British
forces in Helmand brokered a locally negotiated settlement. Not surprisingly, the agreement failed along
tribal lines. Later the same year, the Afghan Parliament passed the controversial Amnesty Resolution,
which offered full amnesty to:
those individuals and groups who are still in armed
opposition . . . and who will end their opposition after this
charter is in effect, join the national reconciliation process
and respect and observe the Constitution and other laws
of the country.18

The resolution was never signed by President Karzai,
and it was largely viewed by the international community as an amnesty effort by those in Parliament to
avoid war crime prosecutions under President Karzai’s endorsed strategy of transitional justice.19
President Barack Obama unveiled his new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2009, stating that
the United States will “work with local leaders, the
Afghan government, and international partners to
have a reconciliation process in every province.”20 The
Obama administration’s efforts to include Pakistan in
a trilateral effort to broker reconciliation among moderate Taliban resonated internationally, and certainly
in Islamabad. Kabul was less enthusiastic, based on its
distrust of Pakistani intentions, rising internal competition over control of the reconciliation effort and its
resources, and valid concerns that Pakistan would use
the effort to reinforce its control over its Taliban proxies rather than genuinely seek peace. The arrest and
semi-permanent detention of Mullah Abdul Ghani
Barader in Karachi by Pakistani intelligence underscored Islamabad’s duplicity, as Barader was a known
advocate for a negotiated settlement. A Saudi-initiated
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dialogue in 2008 was successful at engaging the Quetta
Shura indirectly through Islamabad. Again sabotaged
by Pakistan, the engagement was short-lived but may
have influenced some insurgent attitudes about “the
idea of engagement.”21
The Afghan Government and the U.S.-led coalition
attempted to capitalize on the U.S. troop surge, a new
U.S. administration willing to negotiate with the Taliban, and moderate successes on the battlefield with a
new Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program in July
2010. According to Seth Jones:
ISAF Joint Command had the responsibility to
operationalize reintegration and to help synchronize
efforts from the Afghan government, ISAF, United
Nations Development Program, and other entities.22

However, in a way that recalled the Vietnam War,
escalation of the conflict against the Taliban actually
deepened enemy resolve. In a way that recalled the
politics in Hanoi in the mid-1960s, escalation of the
conflict against the Taliban resulted in hard-liners in
the insurgent leadership pushing aside moderates and
solidifying their control over the national movement.
Despite funding from international donors, International Security Assistance Force prioritization, and
sustained UN efforts, the program was disregarded by
the Taliban leadership, who declared the government
in Kabul to be “puppets of the infidels.”
One outcome of Karzai’s multiple Loya Jirga
peace efforts was the opening of the Taliban’s Doha
(Qatar) office. Over a 5-year period, secret meetings
were held between the United States and the Taliban.
Next, these meetings expanded to include the Afghan
Government in hopes of finding an exit ramp for the
United States. What occurred instead was the Taliban
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breaking an explicit agreement not to open the office in
Doha as an Embassy of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, followed by series of bilateral meetings between
the United States and the Taliban, which was fixated
solely on the release of five senior leaders from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Taliban steadfastly refused to
speak to the Afghan Government, which they have
referred to for years as “illegitimate puppets.” The
Taliban then adroitly manipulated U.S. naiveté and
desire to see this step as a “confidence-building measure” upon which to build for future talks to secure
the freedom of five top members of their high command structure in exchange for U.S. Army deserter
Bowe Bergdahl. Once the Taliban had achieved this
tactical objective, the “talks” ended, as the Taliban had
intended from the start.
Recent Efforts (2012 to 2018)
Little effort at reconciliation took place as U.S.
forces continued to transition security responsibility
to the Afghan National Army (ANA). The Pakistani
ISI forced a couple of low-level Taliban strap-holders
to attend a meeting in Murree with threats of reprisals and promises that they only had to go once to placate the Americans and make it look like Pakistan was
cooperating with the West. Shortly after the failure at
Murree in 2016, a tectonic shift occurred when it was
revealed that the founder of the movement, Mullah
Omar, had been dead for several years. A concerted
effort to connect the collapse of the “talks” at Murree
with the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death is a
case of post hoc ergo propter hoc. In reality, the event
at Murree was a one-time ISI sham. Several senior
Taliban leaders were subsequently assassinated on
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the streets of Quetta, and others were eliminated by
drone strikes before hardliner Mullah Haibatullah, a
religious scholar rather than a fighter in the Taliban’s
medieval religious-military order, took over the position of supreme leader.
Under Haibatullah Akhundzada (Akhundzada is
an honorific, not a name, meaning, loosely, “respected
religious teacher”), Taliban attacks increased, with the
Taliban capturing Kunduz temporarily, seizing most
of Helmand province, and placing significant pressure on the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah.23 So far,
the Taliban campaign in 2018 has seen the temporary
occupations of Faryab and Ghazni and the seizure of
several more districts around the country; in one case,
the Taliban overran and destroyed an entire company
of Afghan commandos.
As of August 2018, reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan remained the centerpiece of the Donald Trump
administration’s “new” South Asia policy, but they
are at a standstill. The Taliban maintain their Doha
office and, in July 2018, Ambassador Alice Wells, the
South Central Asia Senior Bureau Official, held lowlevel discussions with Taliban officials in Doha, apparently arranged by Saudi Arabia. On the battlefield, the
Taliban continue to fight aggressively and make tangible gains across the vast rural areas. They occasionally attack major urban centers, as they did in Kunduz
in 2017 and Faryab and Ghazni in 2018, apparently
more for political and propaganda purposes than
from a desire to seize and permanently hold them. In
all three cases, the Taliban withdrew in good order
rather than being forced out block by block. The misnomered “National Unity Government” under Ashraf
Ghani Ahmadzai continues to carry out limited counteroffensive operations with U.S. support, but is still
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struggling to gain political legitimacy, and establish
the capability to provide a modicum of governance
beyond major urban centers. By August 2018, lacking
the military means to reverse the gains, it was apparent that the U.S.-Afghan coalition was willing to cede
control of Taliban-captured rural districts while continuing to pull security forces back from isolated posts
vulnerable to the Taliban. The United States continues
outreach efforts to the Taliban for peace talks. There
is no overlap, however, in the Venn diagram of what
the Taliban considers an acceptable outcome (elimination of the “puppet government” and Taliban control
of the entire country) and what the United States considers an acceptable outcome (the Taliban acceding to
the current constitution and joining the existing government as a political party).
Analysis
Foreign forces do not win other countries’ internal
conflicts. The future of Afghanistan will be determined
by the Afghans themselves, and the international community cannot want to defeat a Taliban takeover of
Afghanistan more than the Afghan people themselves
want it. However, at this stage, the sustained commitment of U.S. military power and the support of the
international community are critical for the survival of
the current Afghan state.
Analysis of the previous 40 years of reconciliatory
efforts with belligerents similar in method and outlook to the Taliban, coupled with relevant case studies, indicates a very low probability of success for
reconciliation, which is predicated on current levels of
military pressure leading to negotiations and the Taliban integrating into the existing political order. This
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assessment is based on analysis of Taliban statements
and publications; analysis of historical Pashtun tribal
uprisings with similar religious mobilization undercurrents (see appendix III of this volume); and, analysis of historical precedents in insurgency with equally
committed enemy forces, as in the Vietnam conflict, in
which a virtually identical strategy was pursued. In all
of these cases, increasing military pressure and aerial
bombing actually bolstered the enemy’s morale, cohesion, will to resist, and commitment to victory. There
is no reason to believe that what has never worked in
similar insurgencies under similar conditions will now
work in Afghanistan.
In other words, doing more of what we are doing
now within the same parameters is not going to work.
Either what we are doing has to change, or the parameters have to change. Continuing the same ineffective
policies, staying the course, and thinking “inside the
box” are not going to get us where we need to go. The
current glide path is into the side of the mountain, not
over it. In order to achieve a negotiated settlement
in Afghanistan, it is necessary therefore to widen the
acceptable solution spectrum (see figure 4-1) and be
willing to consider less palatable and even unconventional solutions across a broader range of outcomes.
This will likely necessitate accommodation, partition,
acceptance of de-facto Taliban-governed areas, or a
combination of these options.
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Figure 4-1. Outcome Spectrum24
RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 1
The Taliban will not be forced or cajoled into reconciling with the current government, regardless
of the “carrots” from Ghani or the “sticks” from the
United States. In regard to the former, the Taliban
consider the current government to be illegitimate
puppets and refuse to speak to them. In regard to the
latter, the Taliban perceive that they are winning the
war, and can absorb their current level of losses virtually forever. From a purely military standpoint, they
are correct in that assessment, based on the amount of
territory controlled, their available financing, Pashtun
birthrates, their continued access to safe haven, ongoing Pakistani support, lack of popular Afghan Government legitimacy, and their moral acceptability in most
of the Pashtun regions. Mao Zedong theorized that
the guerrilla could win with 15 percent support from
the population. The Taliban are currently estimated to
have 40 percent. The cities of Afghanistan can be held
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as Najibullah held them, but the rural areas, which
contain 75-80 percent of the population, are slowly
slipping away from government control.25 Reports
that Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT continues to
recommend further withdrawals of Afghan security forces from rural outposts in order to strengthen
urban garrisons suggest that efforts to retake rural territory seized by the Taliban are essentially over.26 In
addition, the United States is not likely to pursue the
unprecedented levels of violence, including the direct
targeting of all Taliban mullahs necessary at this stage
to weaken the Taliban will to resist, although historical analysis shows that this level of violence, plus targeting mullahs directly, is required to defeat a rural
Pashtun insurgency in Afghanistan. Therefore, it is
necessary to widen the spectrum of acceptable outcomes to the conflict because it is not going to end
within our current spectrum.
Recommendation 2
The most favorable resolution to the conflict we are
likely to get is accommodation of some variant resulting from a mutually recognized military standoff.
Achieving this, however, would require a reversal of
Taliban momentum, a significant increase in ANDSF
military capabilities, a change in Pakistani behavior,
and a willingness on the part of the Afghan Government and its Western backers to settle for less than the
current expectations. Current policies which consider
the Taliban as if it were a secular political force rather
than a medieval, religious-military order reflect the
same issue found in the Vietnam War, which was a
comprehensive failure to identify and understand the
enemy.
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Recommendation 3
In an insurgency, the only political level that matters is the village—“the level of the people.” District
and provincial centers are irrelevant. This is as true of
Afghanistan as it was of Vietnam. Concurrently, the
interethnic conflict remains unresolved between the
loosely allied Turkic/Dari-speaking ethnic groups
and the Pashtuns, creating a Pashtun belt that divides
Afghanistan roughly into upper and lower halves. It is
the authors’ assessment that Afghanistan is currently
partitioned de facto along tribal lines. The intertribal
conflict among Pashtuns in the lower half of the country continues to be one of the main dynamics of the
war. Where there is conflict in the Pashtun majority
areas, it is not being driven by pro-government sentiments versus Taliban control but, rather, by interPashtun tribal conflict. Some Pashtun tribes remain
fiercely anti-Taliban for local reasons, as discussed
earlier. However, this does not translate to support
for the central government because “The enemy of my
enemy is not necessarily my friend.”27 Figuring out
how to support these elements, and especially security
forces in Kandahar, will be the most difficult aspect of
the endgame. Considerable thought should be given
to this immediately, unless these anti-Taliban elements, like the Montanyards of the Vietnam conflict,
are simply to be left to their fate.
Recommendation 4
Flowing from the assumptions in recommendations 1, 2, and 3, what follows logically is the approach
with the highest likelihood of an outcome that preserves some of the strategic objectives of the United
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States in Afghanistan, as well as some of the social
gains made by minorities and women in the Dari- and
Turkic-speaking regions. This approach is to open
a negotiation space, to include a de facto partition
of the Pashtun-dominated south and east into semiautonomous tribal areas—effectively the current
status quo in much of the south of the country today.
Such regions could remain part of Afghanistan but be
administered in a more federal, autonomous manner,
like Switzerland or the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas in Pakistan. In this scenario, the country retains
its current borders, the Taliban can administer what
they now control, anti-Taliban forces such as those
now operating in Kandahar can be assisted, and the
former Northern Alliance can remain free of Taliban
suzerainty. This could conceivably satisfy both Pakistan’s obsession with “strategic depth” in Afghanistan
and the needs of the United States for counterterrorism bases in Afghanistan. Assessed realistically, the
Kabul government’s bargaining position is not going
to improve over time.
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APPENDIX I. THE SOVIET CONSTRUCTION OF
AFGHANISTAN’S SECURITY FORCES
From 1980 to 1992, the Soviet Union’s efforts to
enhance Afghanistan’s security by training, advising, and assisting the Afghan National Army, Afghan
National Police, and other security forces were in concert with standard counterinsurgency methods. The
Soviets utilized all instruments of national power with
a heavily weighted effort on the military to facilitate
stability within Afghanistan. The Soviet contributions (mostly in the form of developing, equipping,
and training) were not haphazardly implemented, but
substantially aligned with methodical and dedicated
efforts.
THE DESIGN
Although not always the most qualified individuals, the Soviets sent an abundance of specialists who
worked in organizations within the Soviet Union to
bolster Afghanistan’s parallel security organizations.
The Soviet government departments from which
these specialists originated were held directly responsible for their counterpart government departments
within Afghanistan. For example, the Soviet Ministry of Defense (MoD) was responsible for the Afghan
MoD and had the goal of developing and advising the
Afghan military. The Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB), which translates to the Committee for
State Security, advised and assisted the Khadamat-e
Etela at-e Dawlati (KhAD), also known as the Afghan
Secret Police. The Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del (MVD)
or Ministry of Interior directly assisted the Afghan
Saradoy, which held responsibility for the nation’s
police forces and paramilitary units. The Soviets designated senior advisor teams within each department
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to reside in Afghanistan and maintained a chain of
command in Moscow. The Operational Group of the
Ministry of Defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics served as a coordinating body among the
senior advisor teams, with the intent of facilitating
security operations and efforts between Afghan and
Soviet forces.
THE SARANDOY
The Sarandoy, under the Ministry of Interior, consisted of provincial police, corrections facility officers,
and traffic police who were all responsible for the
“broadening and strengthening of government control
through policing and other actions, securing government and party components, and securing important facilities and structures.”1 The Sarandoy policed
throughout the territories with the preference to allow
members to serve in their hometowns. They were centrally commanded at company, battalion, and brigade
levels. This mostly conscripted force, enlarged from
a force of 14,500 in 1980 to over 98,000 in 1987, was
divided into divisions.2 In conjunction with training
the Sarandoy on military tactics to defeat insurgents,
the Soviets supplied the Sarandoy with armored vehicles, mortars, and small arms. The intent was to train
and empower the Sarandoy to be more paramilitary
in nature in order to relieve some of the operational
burden on the Afghan and Soviet militaries.
The Sarandoy focus was on “securing government
control throughout the country, protecting key facilities, and participating in combat operations with military forces against insurgents.”3 The Soviets relied
heavily on the Sarandoy for its reliable intelligence
collection capabilities as well as its competence in
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conducting raids and hostage rescues. In alignment
with many other types of security force leaders, more
than 12,000 Sarandoy officers were trained at MVD
facilities in the Soviet Union.4
THE KHAD
The Afghan State Information Agency, also known
as the KhAD, blanketed Afghanistan with representation in every province, town, and administrative district. This force was comprised of a political
directorate, a personnel directorate, 11 support services, and 11 operational sections. Additionally, the
KhAD had a foreign intelligence branch called the
Tenth Directorate that trained in the Soviet Union
and Kabul, Afghanistan. The KhAD’s roles included
arrests of counter-revolutionaries or opposition, intelligence collection, and counterinsurgency operations.
The KhAD served as a clearing force post-operations
to take captured enemies into custody and to negotiate with local political, militia, and tribal leaders. With
training and advising, the KhAD grew from a force of
roughly 5,000 in 1980 to close to 70,000 by 1988.5
THE AFGHAN MILITARY
Upon occupation, the Soviet Union did not dismantle the substantially sized (three Army Corps)
Afghan Army. The Afghan Army was reorganized
and restructured in a Soviet fashion. The country
was divided into 21 zones of operation and then subdivided into military command areas, with forces
maintaining a permanent presence in each of their
designated areas.6 This design caused the conventional Afghan Army to stagnate because its primary
role was guarding facilities. The Soviets, who were
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taking on the brunt of the combat, transitioned the
Afghan Army away from most security guard duties
and incorporated them into combat roles alongside
Soviet forces. In the mid-1980s, following a few years
integrating combat operations with the Afghans, the
Soviets strived to create an Afghan Army that had
the competence to conduct operations autonomously.
There was some success with independent Afghan
Army operations, but the Soviets retained the brunt of
operational responsibility because of their expertise,
capabilities, and strong will.
The ineffectiveness of the Afghan military is partially attributed to the Soviet advisory methods. The
Soviets embedded advisory teams down to the battalion level, but these advisory teams were not from the
Soviet military force that occupied Afghanistan (40th
Army). The advisory teams were responsible for some
training, compound infrastructure, and payment of
Afghan soldiers. However, the advisory teams rarely
coordinated with the 40th Army. This disconnect
was worsened when the senior advisors reported to
the Soviet Defense Ministry and not the 40th Army
command.
In efforts to shape and strengthen the Afghan military, the Soviets instituted a 2-month training period
for conscripts prior to employing them in the field.
Afghan soldiers were trained on basic skills (weapons,
maneuvers, etc.) and reading and writing. Afghan
officers were trained through Afghan civilian universities, within the Soviet Union, and in Afghan military
academies.
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AVIATION
The Soviets faced a significant challenge in training
and equipping an Afghan aviation force because the
pool in which to find qualified rotary- and fixed-wing
pilots was small. Out of 400 candidates, 5 typically
met the health and education requirements to become
a pilot.7 The qualified candidates typically came from
wealthier families that had the resources to care for
and school their children. The Soviets succeeded in
training pilots to fly independently (40 in 1982) in support of combat operations.8 Although not ambitious,
prone to accidents, and averse to dropping or firing
munitions, the Afghan pilots did provide adequate air
support to Afghan ground forces.
BORDER FORCES
Under the MoD, the Afghanistan Border Guard
grew from 1,200 in 1980 to over 30,000 in 1987.9 The
Soviets saw the Afghan borders, particularly with
Pakistan, as the conduit for mujahideen supplies and
as sanctuary areas for rest and training. Controlling
these borders hampered the mujahideen’s ability to
conduct operations, therefore giving the Afghan and
Soviet forces the opportunity to contain the insurgency. The long border (2,430 kilometers) traverses
over mountainous terrain that is not easily controlled.
The Border Guards were deemed competent and able
to control the border within designated areas, but
there were not enough guards to oversee the vast area.
Their success was minimal.
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CITIZEN MILITIAS
With the assistance of the Soviets, the Afghan Government organized citizen militias across the country. These militias were paid and trained, mostly by
the KhAD and the Sarandoy, with the main purpose
of community defense and propaganda. The militia
participants grew from 18,000 in 1983 to about 35,000
in 1988.10 These citizen militias were somewhat effective in defending villages and places of work but were
eventually marginalized by the robust infiltration of
the mujahideen, particularly throughout the rural
areas.
TRIBAL AND BORDER MILITIAS
Under the MoD, tribal and border militias were
armed groups that worked for the Afghan Government. Many of these militias existed prior to the Soviet
invasion, and some were previously mujahideen
groups that flipped and dedicated their support to the
Afghan Government. These forces were commanded
by Afghan Army officers but had their own internal
commanders who were given military rank and who
reported to the Afghan Army or the KhAD.
The border militias, having lived in the vicinity
of the border their whole lives, were integrated into
the Border Guard, which provided the Border Guards
with local intelligence and knowledge of the terrain.
The regional militias were charged with controlling
the countryside and to “hamper the movement of
rebel groups.”11 These militias received training,
though it was likely minimal, from the Afghan and
Soviet military. The size of the militia forces was
estimated to be between 60,000 to 70,000 in 1990.12
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In addition to training and modest pay, many of the
militias were outfitted with heavy weapons, artillery,
and tanks. The loose authority the Afghan and Soviet
militaries had over these militias, combined with their
training and military equipment, established a high
level of instability throughout the country. Militias’
loyalty wavered among the Afghan Government,
warlords, and tribal ties, all of which undermined the
militias’ role in support of a legitimate Government of
Afghanistan.
TAKEAWAYS
• Soviet military advisors were poorly trained for
an advisory mission, did not understand the
language and culture, and were typically the
least qualified. Competent advisors would have
enabled better coordination and training and
facilitated proficiency within Afghan security
forces.
• Soviet military advisors worked separately
from the Soviet 40th Army and reported to the
Soviet Defense Minister. This separation led to
a disconnect in planning, training, and conducting operations.
• Soviet and Afghan military did not train or conduct exercises together. Fundamentally, units
that do not train together are normally less
effective when conducting combat operations
alongside each other.
• The Soviet 40th Army was not trained in counterinsurgency, nor did the Soviets train the
Afghans on counterinsurgency tactics and strategy. The Soviet and Afghan operations mostly
consisted of “clear and sweep” missions, which
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•

•

•

•

•

have proven to be ineffective when executing a
counterinsurgency operation.
Although a force of over 30,000, the Border
Guards were not positioned on lines of communication and did not attack mujahideen
supply routes. The Border Guards’ strategy was
flawed with inadequate positioning and a lack
of aggressiveness.
Militias were overly equipped and not adequately controlled by the Afghan or Soviet military. The militias, specifically after the Soviet
withdrawal, changed loyalties in support of
warlord and tribal affiliations.
Afghan Army unit strength was at 53 percent,
with 43 percent of officers not receiving officer
training in 1983.13 This can be attributed to a
high desertion rate (the Afghan Army’s desertion rate was 30,941 in 1988), anti-government
mujahideen propaganda, not meeting recruiting goals, and dissatisfaction with a soldier’s
life.14
Although the Soviets incorporated mullahs
into the Afghan military ranks to assist in
morale, religious facilities and prayer opportunities were not provided. Not promoting and
allowing Muslims to practice their religion is
antagonistic and deters their focus on mission
accomplishment.
The Soviets did not adequately train or require
the Afghans to repair and maintain equipment
and vehicles, which led to a low degree of readiness. Most of the vehicles (air and ground)
fell into disrepair when the Soviets withdrew.
With the lack of equipment, the Afghan Army
became ineffective against the insurgents.
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• As the Soviet occupation progressed, the command and control over all of the security forces
was not understood between the MoD and
Ministry of Interior. Conflicting guidance, lines
of accountability, and reporting became foggy
between the ministries.
• Soviet forces destroyed villages, dishonored
mosques, and conducted various human rights
violations. Their profoundly unprofessional
behavior influenced the local populace to turn
against the Afghan Government and, in many
cases, support the mujahideen.
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APPENDIX II. AFGHAN RECONCILIATION
HISTORICAL REVIEW
Najibullah was now determined to accept the reality of the
country: ‘national reconciliation is a precise calculation of
the present national and tribal structure of our society’.
People like rebel leader Abdul Hakim, commanding
2,000 mujahidin in Herat Province, went over to the
government partly because of material support from the
government, but mainly thanks to the fact that Kabul
had ‘corrected its mistakes,’ recognizing the limits of its
authority and avoiding interfering with local affairs. Had
the government tried to interfere once more, he would
have had no problem in taking up arms again.1

The stunningly quick capitulation of the Taliban;
close cooperation with the Northern Alliance partners; and rapid, aggressive pursuit of al-Qaeda across
the Pashtun-held regions of Afghanistan created a
stunned group of security and political actors nearly
completely beholden to the United States and our
political, military, and diplomatic efforts in conjunction with Pakistan and the emerging Northern Alliance leadership.
The United States chose Hamid Karzai, a Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) contact and minor Afghan
political figure, to lead the interim Government of
Afghanistan, effectively short-circuiting any indigenous process. The only real historical source of political stability in Afghanistan, the monarchy, was shut
down by the United States during the Bonn Process,
which heavily favored the northern Afghan ethnolinguistic groups. Under effective U.S. control, a new
Afghan constitution was put in place which imagined a liberal parliamentary democracy in a fractious,
feudal, tribal society with 10 percent literacy. The
resulting government was seen to largely exclude a
85

broad swath of Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, the
Pashtuns.
The refusal to negotiate with any belligerent entity
centered on hardline political personalities within the
George W. Bush administration captured under the
“we do not negotiate with terrorists” rhetoric. This
strong statement demonstrated American ignorance
of the strategic situation across Afghanistan and Pakistan after the fall of the Taliban.
The U.S.-led coalition, composed of mostly CIA
and Special Forces operatives supporting the Northern Alliance and other former mujahideen and tribal
leaders, had “scores of Taliban fighters defect for
money and the promise of honorable positions in the
new government.”2 This cash infusion, coupled with
promises of positions in the new, U.S.-backed Afghan
Government to former mujahideen and tribal leaders
“alongside whom commanders and fighters had battled earlier . . . prompted many early realignments.”3
Despite the significant number of early Taliban
peace and reconciliation overtures, many of the early,
successful negotiations and realignments favorable to
the newly forming Afghan Government were local or
regional at best, despite clear signals that the Taliban
were willing to negotiate. Furthermore, Abdul Wahid,
selected by Mullah Omar in 2001 to lead the surrender
effort, reconciled with the Afghan Government several years later. Walid’s example was not the normal
path charted by the United States and the Afghan-led
Government, despite the clear willingness of the Taliban and tribal rivals to negotiate when conditions
were favorable.
Frequently, the fate of Taliban leaders and their
groups seeking opportunities to reconcile met the
same fate as Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil in February
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2002. Wakil, “the Taliban’s Foreign Minister and a
man widely regarded as the most reasonable Taliban leader, voluntarily approached the new Afghan
authorities expressing a desire to join the new order.”4
He was subsequently arrested; held in the U.S. detention facility in Bagram, Afghanistan; and “then held
under house arrest.”5
Colin Clarke expertly articulates from Thomas
Ruttig that the U.S. strategy during this timeframe
was essentially “mopping up Taliban remnants,”
which complemented the U.S. policy pertaining to not
talking to terrorists.6 It is unclear whether the Taliban,
in disarray in late 2001 and early 2002, were in a position to participate in a coherent manner at the Bonn
Conference or even integrate any political entity into
the emerging Kabul government.7 Even more uncertain is whether U.S. policymakers would have allowed
the Taliban to integrate into the Kabul government.
While Karzai made overtures to the Taliban,
Northern Alliance warlords sought to consolidate and
expand their power in the emerging government and
settle old scores. Concurrently, the United States and
the United Nations (UN) felt little need to talk with
the Taliban as it was a dying organization. The United
States and the UN Security Council contradicted Karzai’s efforts by maintaining a list of Taliban leaders
and senior officials generated prior to the international intervention.8 However, the United States generated its own blacklist of more than 150 individuals
who were suspected of conducting terrorist attacks or
harboring and aiding al-Qaeda which heavily overlapped with the UN list.9 The United States and the
coalition immediately started detaining these suspects, many of whom were senior Taliban officials
and mid-level commanders. The blacklist grew as
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the terror threat assessment changed. To add further
confusion to the post-Taliban lull from 2001 to 2003,
many Taliban leaders were the subject of “predatory”
arrests, seizures, and harassment tactics, particularly
in the Pashtun regions, despite efforts to invoke traditional reconciliation and reintegration methods.10 Old
scores settled from behind the new Karzai administration often leveraged ill-advised U.S. or coalition raids
or arrests, undermining traditional, tribal-based, reconciliation and reintegration methods and clearly contradicting Karzai’s public rhetoric on reconciliation.
Michael Semple stated that, during this period, “most
[Taliban] were left in an ambiguous position in terms
of their status relative to the new administration and
coalition forces.”11
Professor Mojadedi was to reach out to insurgents
and, upon reconciliation, provide them with government reconciliation paperwork. The program had
field offices, one of which administered a reentry program for insurgents arriving from Pakistan and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. That office featured a guesthouse
and offered economic aid to reconciled insurgents.12
The Program-e Tahkim-e Sulh (Strengthening
Peace Program), one of the few programs that could
claim international legitimacy through funding, was
comprehensive in its execution, and received significant media attention. On the heels of British efforts
with the Taliban unconnected to the Kabul government, President Karzai stepped in to welcome former
Taliban provincial governor Mullah Abdul Salaam
and appointed him a district administrator ahead of
the efforts led by the United Kingdom and the Afghan
National Army (ANA) to recapture Musa Qala.13
The British forces, along with the ANA, brokered
a cease-fire in the Musa Qala district center, with all
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sides accommodating each other’s presence. The British forces and the ANA were able to keep the district
center open and free of attacks to encourage economic
growth and development, while the Taliban fighters
avoided the district center and did not attack coalition
members, ANA members, or Afghans taking advantage of the government or coalition development
efforts.
On March 27, 2009, the White House released
the “White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s
Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan.” The report listed “Encouraging Afghan government efforts to integrate reconcilable insurgents”
as one of the principal objectives.14 The white paper
further articulated the Obama administration’s policy,
stating:
While Mullah Omar and the Taliban’s hard core
that have aligned themselves with al Qaeda are not
reconcilable and we cannot make a deal that includes
them, the war in Afghanistan cannot be won without
convincing non-ideologically committed insurgents
to lay down their arms, reject al Qaeda, and accept the
Afghan Constitution. … We can help this process along
by exploiting differences among the insurgents to divide
the Taliban’s true believers from less committed fighters.
Integration must be Afghan-led. An office should be
created in every province and we should support efforts
by the Independent Directorate of Local Governance to
develop a reconciliation effort targeting mid-to-low level
insurgents to be led by provincial governors.15

The program included a High Peace Council, complete with provincial and district committees to assist
in overseeing the effort. The program added economic
incentives, which were missing in previous efforts
by the Karzai administration, UN Development Programme, and International Security Assistance Forces.
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The new program included a Force Reintegration Cell
run by International Security Assistance Forces to
“help facilitate the delivery of policy, resources, and
capabilities in support of reintegration.”16 Further
straining a series of diplomatic patches by the United
States, Karzai vented publicly about U.S. and International Security Assistance Forces engaging without his lead or consent, alluding to accusations that
the United States denied the Afghan Government the
right to lead peace and reconciliation efforts.
In April 2016, the Taliban announced that their
leader, Mullah Omar, had been dead for several years.
Shortly after that announcement, Mullah Aktar Mansour became the new Taliban leader. Immediately,
Pakistan attempted secret peace talks, which failed
after newly appointed Mullah Akhtar Mansour was
killed in a U.S. drone strike in May 2016.
From 1978 to the present, reconciliation efforts
have been many and varied, with some achieving success, but none decisive enough to achieve reconciliation at the national level. After 40 years of trial and
tribulation, the following lessons are critical when discussing any future reconciliation issues:
1. The Taliban, warlords, and mujahideen leaders do not form a monolithic, anti-government
entity. Rather, the Taliban is comprised of multiple entities of varying complexity representing
opportunities to reconcile individually versus
lengthy, unsuccessful efforts at national-level
reconciliation requiring consensus.
2. The Taliban have deep tribal affiliations that
impact their propensity to reconcile specific
sets of grievances. The more complete the tribal
understanding, the better the odds of reconciliation solutions.
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3. The Taliban are susceptible to provincial, district, and local power-sharing arrangements
with the central government that equate to a
cease-fire and government accommodation of
the group into reigning over select segments of
traditional tribal or ethnic lands.
4. The Taliban or any other anti-government group
from the last 40 years should be receptive to dialogue and see it as a traditional means of resolving disputes. However, none of these groups,
specifically the Taliban, will compromise on
their demands when they perceive that they
are winning on the battlefield. The Taliban will
absorb significant leader and fighter losses and
still not compromise or negotiate, particularly
when it involves a foreign power or occupant.
5. The government and foreign entities need to be
united, coherent, and credible for the Taliban or
other insurgent groups to trust reconciliation
efforts. Follow-through and organized support at each echelon is critical. Individual trust
and credibility are often best achieved through
“political patronage” or sponsorship, leveraging tribal and traditional Afghan ethnic values
of protection.17
6. The Afghan Government, foreign powers, and
international supporters that have sought to
negotiate with the Taliban or any other antigovernment entity in Afghanistan in the last 40
years have encountered many problems. The
United States and the Afghan Government are
forced by regional history and culture to seek
negotiations and corresponding reconciliation
from a position of political and military strength,
as they did in 2001-2003. Insurgent groups have
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historically used reconciliation or cease-fires as
ruses or ploys to enhance operational capabilities or pursue strategic, intermediate objectives.
The prospects for Afghan reconciliation after the
rise of Antonio Giustozzi’s proclaimed “Neo Taliban
movement” in 2006-2007 has been reframed in the
context “of a search for peaceful, political approaches
that will stabilize a deteriorating situation—that is,
win the war.”18 Paradoxically, reconciliation in the
Western tradition is no longer possible in a postconflict Afghanistan, without first changing the battlefield calculus of the insurgents. Recent events in
Afghanistan prove this valuable lesson.
ANNEX: PASHTUN UPRISING AND HADDA
MULLAH CASE STUDY
The Pashtun revolt allows for informative analysis
about the socio-political nature of the two conflicts.
Both groups are Pashtun, straddle the Durand line,
and move freely through the porous border between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both share foreign intervention as an impetus for perpetuating the conflict with
fervor. Both share conservative Sunni theology and are
driven by a long-standing, unresolved, intertribal conflict that generated opportunities for mullahs and their
interpretations and teachings through madrassas and
isolated Pashtuns to displace traditional Khans and
Maliks with mullah leadership, obfuscating traditional
tribal conflict resolution.
How the mullahs were targeted by the British and
the impacts of this targeting on the end of the uprising
are noteworthy. The mullahs were widely known to
employ a distributed and resilient mullah social net-
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work that interconnected the majority of the Pashtuns
at the tribal and religious levels, whether advanced
teacher, deputy, or pupil. These strong, redundant, social and hierarchical connections across Pashtun tribal
regions enabled the mobilization of the Pashtuns and
powerful religious messaging to excite the Pashtun
masses, leveraging foreign provocation to rally the
tribes against the threat to their way of life.
Brutal responses from the British, such as targeting
homes, crops, and the mullahs themselves, were effective in severing the mullah social network over time,
undermining the mullahs’ direct mandate for Jihad
from God, and destroying the myth that the mullahs
were undefeatable and that they wielded the best solution to perceived British provocations in their lands.
Interestingly, the British studied the uprising with
fervent dedication, which led to a change to the “forward policy,” suggesting it was too provocative and
costly in Pashtun regions. As a result, the British transitioned to “local militias and the deployment of more
Political Officers.”19 In one case, 130 mullahs attended
a jirga in which the Hadda Mullah preached vehement
anti-British sermons; the jirga deeply affected “Hadda
Mullah’s murids (acolytes) . . . [who] offered to end all
clan feuds in order to facilitate this greater calling [italics in original].”20
Pashtun society values consensus dictating no man can
direct another what to do or allow their consequences to
impact another without agreement under Pashtunwali
perpetuating conflict when aligned with other Pashtunwali tenets like badal or nung.21

Pashtuns are fractured based on their organization
into clans, tribes, and subtribes, and their geographic
dispersion. This organizational structure acts as both a
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strength for mullahs to excite and exploit and a weakness that the British attempted to exploit. The British
did so by isolating subgroups, destroying their homes
and crops, and offering resources in exchange for demobilization and an agreement to end fighting and accommodate the British that was based on quid pro quo
arrangements.
the fragmented nature of Pashtun society was beginning
to have an effect. On 21 November 1897, the jirgas of the
Malikdin Khel, Kambar-Khel, Adam-Khel, and the AkaKhel offered to accept British terms, namely a fine, the
restitution of property, the surrender of 800 rifles, and a
formal act of submission [italics in original].22

British political officer interrogations yielded a confession about the reasons for the revolt. Political officer
Robert Brice wrote that the Pashtuns blamed the revolt on 1,500 mullahs from Ningrahar, while another
political officer was convinced that the source of the
revolt was local grievances.23 Robert Johnson further
concludes from his research of Pashtun accounts of the
revolt that Pashtun fanaticism “was, in fact an impassioned reaction to the changes they could see taking
place around them as the British advanced into their
territory, or, eroded their way of life.”24 The perception
of the threat matters just as much as the actual threat―
both illicit fear and a call for honor-bound Pashtuns to
resist as long as foreigners remained in Afghanistan.25
The high Pashtun attrition resulted from British
employment of fixed fortifications on key terrain and
rapid troop positioning using roads to enable classic,
pitched battles against the lashkars that included pursuit and exploitation efforts. After decisive battles, a favorite tactic was to destroy houses and crops to lure the
remaining Pashtun fighters into the open terrain and
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overcome them by leveraging superior tactics, small
arms, and artillery fires.26 Over time, the British cycle
of response shifted to include punitive expeditions to
attrite Pashtun fighters and destroy their homes, crops,
and resources.
The Pashtun revolt, which began in 1897 and concluded with the death of the Hadda Mullah in 1903,
illuminates numerous historical factors and determinants relevant to the ongoing Taliban insurgency,
which consists of mostly Pashtuns fighting in territories
traditionally held by Pashtuns. The case study is captivating because of the strong correlations between the
Pashtun revolt and the Taliban of today. The Pashtun
uprising informs us on numerous levels what factors
will enable conditions for reconciliation, and provides
likely determinants for success in reconciling with the
Taliban and accomplishing U.S. strategic objectives in
South Asia. Arguably, like the Pashtuns of today, the
Pashtuns of the early 20th century did not want to defy
Islam. For that reason, “a collective pressure [to fight]
created a momentum that was hard to resist.”27
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APPENDIX III. COLOMBIA’S RECONCILIATION
WITH THE FARC—CASE STUDY
To understand reconciliation, it is important to
know that each country and society has to find its own
solution to achieve peace. In addition, as Desmond
Tutu says in the handbook Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, written in 2003, “new solutions must be
devised that are appropriate to the particular context,
history and culture in question [emphasis added].”1
Nevertheless, reconciliation is more likely to succeed if there is happiness, welfare, and productivity.2
When a reconciliation process needs to be initiated,
common goals between parties must be established.
At this moment, the initial phase may be called the
“pre-agreements,” where both parties agree to these
common objectives. Also, it is important to know that
a reconciliation process will end in the creation of policies that will affect both parties. Changes in laws, and
even in the constitution of the state, may be required
in order to achieve a real reconciliation.3
Recently, Afghanistan began one more attempt to
achieve reconciliation. The Afghan High Peace Council (HPC) announced it is ready to hold peace talks
with the Taliban without any preconditions.4 This case
study examines why the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC) accepted negotiations and the
reasons individuals demobilized years before negotiations. The case study will analyze the negotiation
process to end conflict, Colombia’s military strategy
to take the FARC to negotiations, the demobilization
program before talks, and the differences between the
two conflicts. Conclusions and recommendations will
end this appendix.
Before formal talks with the FARC, some secret
encounters between representatives from each side
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occurred. These encounters defined an agenda that
had to be followed when formal negotiations started.
This agenda was made up of five points that attempted
to cover the causes and effects of the conflict. The five
points were rural reform, political participation, illicit
drugs, victims, and the end of the conflict.5 Each point
had to be discussed to arrive at a solution. To compare
Colombia with Afghanistan, the main demand by
the Taliban is the withdrawal of foreign troops. This
withdrawal could be the first point to be discussed
among others, all of which would have to be established while building the agenda. In Colombia’s case,
the most important activity before the talks began was
establishing the key issues to be discussed. Therefore,
it is vital for the HPC and the Taliban to identify those
fundamental concerns when talks start. These concerns may be grouped to avoid a list of requirements
that will only make negotiations longer. Once these
key issues have been determined, a timeline for each
of them has to be established. Participants should be
made aware that the issues likely will not be solved
overnight.
Identifying the key agenda points is a subject to
analyze in future negotiations with the Taliban since
some neutral and external actors have to be identified
to participate in the process. Parties may feel compromised during negotiations without those neutral
or external actors. Indeed, the United Nations (UN)
presence in Colombia guaranteed FARC concentration
and, thereafter, the handing over of their weapons.
External or third-party actors have key roles in planning, participation, and contributions toward success.
The Colombian Government demanded a ceasefire from the FARC in addition to the five points of
the initial agenda. During the talks, the terrorist group
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ceased hostilities, and, after more than 3 years of negotiations, both sides agreed to a cease-fire. Some optimism started to emerge, but society did not entirely
trust the negotiations. Negotiators had to tolerate
FARC representatives’ arrogance, which was not easy
for them to do. The president intended to achieve the
end of the conflict, and sometimes society indicated
that the price to obtain peace could be too high. Whenever FARC negotiators appeared on the news, they
showed a sense of euphoria to the public, as if they
were declaring victory over the government. It was
clear that this was not the case because, if the FARC
were winning, they would have never sat at the table
to negotiate. Maybe the president had to wait before
approaching the FARC to negotiate to let military
operations continue for at least another year and allow
the enemy to become weaker. FARC leaders were
hiding in Venezuela, desertions from their ranks were
increasing every day, the population supported the
armed forces as the operations were successful, the
state’s holistic approach was proving to be effective,
and insubordination was occurring within the FARC.
The FARC was becoming weaker as time progressed.
Nevertheless, negotiations continued, and many
“frogs had to be swallowed.”6
Military operations were key in causing the FARC
to negotiate. However, during the talks, the FARC’s
demands reached unexpected levels, even though
the state was defeating the FARC in battle. Therefore,
politically, the country became more polarized on
account of the negotiations. However, at the end of the
talks, the ones who turned in their weapons, explosives, uniforms, and “caletas,” and the ones who submitted to justice, were the FARC members.7 In other
words, a transitional justice was established to which
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some former members of the state, including members
of the military, had to submit. In short, many crimes
committed because of the conflict by armed forces
members and other institutions required this type of
justice, which had benefits on both sides of the conflict.
At the time of this writing, the FARC has demobilized as an armed group, handed over its weapons,
and submitted to transitional justice. Simultaneously,
the FARC obtained 10 seats in congress, created its
own political party, and avoided jail time. To put it
another way, the terrorist group obtained more than
society was expected to grant. Violence decreased but
did not end because of the existence of many other
criminal groups that commit crimes and threaten the
Colombian population in several regions. FARC dissent groups persist in drug trafficking, and Venezuela
has not stopped being a safe haven. It is probably more
accurate to see how military strategy succeeded in
weakening the rebels than to see the mixture of political concerns that appeared after the FARC became
a legal party. However, a strategy that included not
only military operations but also other types of activities covering the areas that the FARC was dominating
is worth further study. Demobilization programs and
military control of areas are the subjects of the next
part of this appendix.
COLOMBIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY TO TAKE
THE FARC TO NEGOTIATIONS
When the FARC started as a guerrilla group, its
ideology was Marxist-Leninist-oriented. Many rural
areas of Colombia had no state presence, and the country had just endured terrible bipartisan violence. Communists found a perfect environment in which to grow
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their ideas and promote an armed rebellion against the
state using guerrilla warfare. Colombia saw the issue
as a security problem and not as a menace to democracy. Therefore, when a specific region was threatened
by guerrillas, the state sent the army to manage the
violent groups. The Colombian Army had experience
in maintaining its presence and avoiding the culmination of a level-of-war growth of bipartisan violence.
Guerrillas used the tactics that Mao Zedong and Che
Guevara promulgated, a small-group offensive methodology that encouraged melding the forces with the
population.8
Colombian armed forces leaders developed a plan
that aimed to reach isolated towns, where basic needs
were not fulfilled. The army would bring medical aid,
barber services, and some entertainment. These activities were called civic-military day trips and were done
simultaneously with military operations. The plan was
named, “Lazo.”9 If this plan had garnered proper government support, the guerrillas’ success would have
been less probable. The Colombian Army had just
started to know the environment that encompasses
counterinsurgency warfare. When this plan enabled
the recovering of many zones, the FARC found out
that the state could be a competitor in the areas where
it had influence.
The FARC knew it needed to keep the army busy
and that it needed to use guerrilla warfare tactics.
Ambushing regular troops and hiding among the population, the irregulars were able to take advantage of
any move the army was making. At the beginning of
the war, the guerrillas did not try any frontal attacks
but initiated raids and ambushes. The army tried to
be stronger, but it was slow to adapt, and the guerrillas’ influence was increasing in many areas of the
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country. The army’s strategy was not clear, and the
government just wanted to destroy the rebels. Large
operations were executed, but when significant results
were not accomplished, the FARC felt empowered by
their ability to maneuver and disperse in both rural
and urban environments. During the 1970s and 1980s,
there was no vision of a grand strategy, and the threat
consumed the military and the police. At the beginning of the 1990s, guerrillas already had the power
to attack company-size military bases.10 In December 1990, more than 300 guerrillas attacked a military
base in Taraza, Antioquia, where Lieutenant Colonel
Jaime Fajardo, the battalion commander, was posted.
During the attack, Fajardo lost his life.11 For the rest
of that decade, guerrillas could concentrate and scatter
swiftly, which allowed them to conduct more attacks.
The army started to adapt, creating what is now
called the Mobile Brigades. These units began to do
Military Control of Areas (MCA), in which regular
units remained in a region, patrolled, and showed
their presence. These units were always looking for
the enemy based on terrain intelligence. Many times,
Mobile Brigades and their units had encounters in
which guerrillas did not expect to meet them. The
Colombian Army adapted well, and battalions started
to operate in smaller units; as a result, their movements
were not detected. In fact, the army used the same
tactics that the guerrillas used; these tactics included
organizing into small units, moving during the night,
and conducting irregular and unpredictable maneuvers. Numerous times, due to laziness, lack of military
professionalism, and attrition, failures occurred. Long
deployments in the jungle or the mountains exhausted
the troops, but the permanent presence of troops
enabled them to know the areas and the population.
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Competition against the FARC in other areas outside
of the fight was underway, but all of that could not
take place until a holistic strategy had been created.
A strategy that involved all of the agencies and the
total determination of the state did not exist until President Álvaro Uribe took office in 2002. Some military
operations were successful before this administration,
but a significant strategy to weaken the FARC had not
been implemented. Integration of efforts, including
U.S. support, military budget augmentation, institutional involvement, regional leadership commitment,
and intelligence cooperation among all agencies contributed to the takeover of the FARC over the next 8
years and reduced it to its weakest point in decades.12
One of the most significant factors that made the
FARC weak was itself. The indiscriminate kidnappings; the recruiting of children by force, rape, and
terror; the attacks on small towns; and the destruction
of infrastructure caused the population to hate the
FARC. As a result, the Colombian Military Forces and
the National Police developed a strategy that let them
perform an adequate MCA that pushed the FARC to
a strategic withdrawal. Once this pressure was complete, intelligence obtained by human and technological means let the army find high value targets (HVTs).
Some of the FARC’s most important leaders who were
scattered along the county’s rural areas were found.
Hence, armed forces carried out military operations
that attacked these HVTs. This led to the weakening
of the command and control capability of the FARC
as it hid its group’s leaders. The long presence of the
army deployed deep in guerrilla areas, the adequate
MCA, the location of HVTs, the irregularity of military
operations, and the integration of all state institutions
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resulted in the Colombian Government achieving
near-victory over the terrorists.
It is important to clarify that the army was in
charge of rural areas and police were in charge of
urban areas. Nevertheless, operations were made
simultaneously, or they were coordinated between the
two organizations. Mobile Brigades became irregular;
this meant that they were conducting counter-guerrilla operations. The Colombian Army developed
its own doctrine within The Irregular Combat Manual,
which had many editions, but essentially developed
procedures that eliminated conventional warfare techniques. Operations lasted for long periods of time and
platoon-sized units stayed in the area of operations
for as much as 4 months without going back to base.
They were resupplied by air or on the roads every
2 or 3 weeks and then went back into the jungle or
the mountains. The omnipresent order was to be as
unpredictable as possible; any routine was a detriment to their tactics. Having these operations based
on many types of intelligence helped the army to track
the enemy, and the main victory was that territories
controlled by the FARC were taken away from it. This
process took years and was not the only method used
to obtain victory over the group. The holistic approach
and the demobilization program were fundamental
factors in weakening the FARC. The demobilization
approach used brigades, called “territorial brigades,”
which were different from the mobile ones; they used
demobilization programs, psychological operations,
offensive operations, MCA operations, operations
coordinated with the National Police, and others that
used simultaneous training cycles. When areas were
recovering from FARC menace, some of the other
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agencies of the government started to arrive at places
where even the mayors could not perform their duties.
DEMOBILIZATION PROGRAM BEFORE TALKS
Another significant factor in helping to defeat
guerrillas is next analyzed. The Humanitarian Attention Program to Demobilized Individuals (HAPDI)
designed a package of benefits to promote demobilization that was not made only to FARC members but
also to other illegal groups’ adherents.13 These benefits
included entire families; thus, if the person thinking of
demobilization had a family, he or she would not have
to worry about his or her family not obtaining those
benefits. One of the benefits was that, at the end of the
process, the demobilized person would have a proper
place to live until he or she was financially able to
obtain housing independently. Transitory homes were
acquired by the government for the program; these
were located in some of the main cities of the country. When those who joined the program were taken
to their hometowns, a special allowance was issued
in order to let them have access to public transportation. This allowance provided evidence of freedom of
mobility since some insurgents thought that once they
joined the program, they were going to jail.
When guerrilla members decided to abandon their
organizations, most of the time they had no clothing other than their uniforms; therefore, the program
offered more than two outfits to the deserters. Healthcare was also a benefit provided to all demobilized
people. In some cases, demobilized people were afraid
that victims of the violence carried out by the group
to which the demobilized person had belonged would
try to retaliate once they became a civilian. Therefore,
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security was also provided. Furthermore, since most
of the insurgents for most of their lives were in an illegal environment and committing crimes, psychological attention had to be offered to them as well.
The Ministry of Defense had to issue a certificate to
adherents who wished to join the program. To obtain
this document, each person had to demonstrate he
or she belonged to one of those illegal organizations,
had a real will to abandon the group, and had never
committed a crime against humanity. Afterward, the
program would grant a legal identification card since
these ex-combatants had never had the opportunity
to be genuine citizens. Then, judicial benefits were
granted because, even though adherents joined the
program, they still belonged to an illegal group, and
that constituted a crime in and of itself. In Colombia,
the punishment for rebellion is jail time; however,
since many adherents were political lawbreakers, the
program sometimes granted them amnesty. After joining the program and obtaining a certificate, an adherent would receive permanent psychological care, and
demobilized persons were tracked. Likewise, the
program included a literacy plan, since most of the
people joining the program did not know how to read
or write. This plan was followed with an elementary
and high school education that helped members of the
program earn their school certificates. Whenever studies were completed, additional training was provided
that focused on a specific job or occupation. Here,
counseling on designing a new life project accompanied the education plan. The objective was to equip
adherents who joined the program with the necessary
tools to have a productive life and economic autonomy. The main program goal has been to help demobilized people “Return to the Society.”14
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The program developed a handbook that was distributed over the areas where the FARC and other illegal groups had influence and presence. The purpose
was to clarify every step of the program to avoid any
misunderstanding and, especially, to create confidence in FARC members at the moment of abandonment. The handbook, which tried to be as detailed as
possible, explained six steps. First, it provided adherents instructions regarding how to turn themselves
in to authorities with as much military equipment as
possible, especially weapons. The handbook also had
a list of phone numbers for adherents to call if they
wanted to ask questions or arrange their surrender.
When adherents called the numbers, they could hear
detailed recorded instructions.
Following the handbook instructions, the second
step talked about what was going to happen the first
night out of the illegal organization. Regulations
ordered officials in charge of military bases, police
stations, and other state installations to accommodate
defectors and provide hot food. Some of the regulations were created after interviews with guerrillas who
described the concerns that they had before making
the decision to defect.
Third, the directions stated that the week after
the desertion, adherents would have to participate in
interviews, and nothing much would happen since
the program needed time to arrange for their accommodation and prepare paperwork. If an adherent was
a minor, he or she would be sent to the Colombian
Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) and would bypass the
interview stage.15
The fourth step stated that the adherent had to
spend the following month in the “Peace Home.” The
Peace Home was a place where accommodation, food,
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a TV room, a reading room, personal care supplies,
and food would be provided. The amount of time
spent in that home would depend on how long the
Ministry of Defense would take to issue the certificate
that confirmed that the guerrilla had been accepted
into the program.
As a fifth step, adherents had to demonstrate that
they had been a member of an illegal group, that they
were serious about leaving the group, and that they
had not committed crimes against humanity.
For the final step, the adherent learned how to read
and write, received an elementary and high school
education, received training for a specific occupation,
and received a subsidy with which to start a project.
This would end the steps of reintegration. However,
the government continued to track the adherent and
maintained contact with him or her.
THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE
TWO CONFLICTS
It is important to understand the differences
between Afghanistan and Colombia and the two conflicts that this appendix has discussed. First, in the
economic sector the gross domestic product growth
for 2017 in Afghanistan was 2.5 points; in Colombia,
it was 1.7 points (according to the International Monetary Fund).16 The two countries’ size and population
also present challenges for establishing control over
the territories. While Afghanistan is 652,230 square
kilometers, Colombia is 1,141,748 square kilometers.
That is about 490,000 square kilometers of difference.
In terms of population, Colombia and Afghanistan
are also relatively different; according to The World
Factbook, there are 47,698,524 people in Colombia and
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34,124,811 people in Afghanistan.17 Furthermore, it
is known that, among the three most difficult geographies in the world, Afghanistan and Colombia are
placed second and third, respectively, after Nepal.
In addition, 27.8 percent of Colombia’s population is
below the poverty line; that statistic for Afghanistan
is 35.8 percent.18 These comparisons suggest that the
same solutions that worked in Colombia could perhaps work in Afghanistan. For instance, the Colombian rural population was quite vulnerable which
made the FARC a reliable means of support, and, in
turn, created the motivation for the population to join
the group. That critical economic environment and its
associated social problems were a breeding ground in
which the FARC could find recruits, as is the case for
the Taliban in Afghanistan now. Thus, there are economic and social measures that could be taken, rather
than just military action, to weaken the Taliban.
Conversely, data from The World Bank suggests
that education must be a major focus in Afghanistan. The illiteracy rate was more than 50 percent in
Afghanistan in 2011; whereas, in Colombia, it has been
reduced to 1.8 percent through a change to government policy concerning education.19 A comprehensive
strategy should incorporate education because when
a population is enlightened, it is less likely to support
a group like the FARC or the Taliban. Nonetheless,
if people are starving, education will have less of an
effect on their attitudes toward illegal groups. Starving people are more likely to follow those who provide them with food. For that reason, as much as an
educational course of action should be taken, an economic one that provides a minimum standard of life
should be taken too. Colombia understood that the
government had a competitor, especially in the rural
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areas. Certainly, in order to reach those areas where
the presence of the state was needed, the army had
to be the first to arrive. As was said earlier, a strategy
modeled after plan “Lazo” and adapted to Afghanistan’s strategic environment could have good results.
In fact, elements like access to electricity do not differ
much from one country to the other: 90.5 percent of
the population in Colombia has access to electricity, whereas 87.8 percent of Afghanis have access to
it. Besides, both countries have similar agricultural
land to entire country ratios: Afghanistan has 379,100
square kilometers of agricultural land, while Colombia
has 449,871 square kilometers.20 This is why one of the
five points established by the Colombian Government
and the FARC to be discussed during negotiations
was agricultural reform. For Afghanistan, agriculture
would be even more important, taking into account
that employment in the agricultural industry in this
country is 48 percent greater than it is in Colombia.
CONCLUSIONS
When any negotiation process begins, the main
goal is to establish what both parties see as the best
outcome. The Colombian Government found the correct starting line when it defined five clear points to
discuss based on how it wanted the negotiations to
end. In Afghanistan, the HPC has started to organize
talks with the Taliban, but having the agenda planned
like the Colombian Government did with the five
points is essential. It was an adequate path that the
FARC accepted due to the government’s strong arguments. The FARC saw in that agenda a way to achieve
some of the goals the organization had been struggling to reach for decades. The HPC has to motivate
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the Taliban with an agenda that encourages them to
sit and talk. Key points in the agenda have to show
that, in the end, the Taliban will not only reconcile and
cease hostilities but will also obtain something to their
benefit.
The Colombian military included several other
institutions in its strategy. However, operations have
been decisive. The counter-guerrilla (or, more appropriately, counter-insurgent) concept was understood
by the army in terms of tactics. These tactics were that
of an irregular force rather than a regular force. It is
important to note that it took years to achieve strategic results, but it is also important to note that, in
many areas of the country, territorial control had not
been performed by any agency before MCA. Irregularity and lack of routine on the field were key factors
in the Colombian Army’s success. The new Afghan
National Army has to be trained in tactics that let it
focus on operations for a long time. As a result, the
army will know the terrain and the population and,
once it assimilates into the environment, intelligence
will flow more freely. Years of the Colombian Army’s
presence in affected areas helped it to find HVTs who
were part of the center of gravity of the FARC. Nevertheless, the political decision to integrate all of the
elements of power was fundamental in applying the
military strategy. Notwithstanding Afghan institutional weakness, plans of integration could have positive results.
The demobilization strategy was as successful as
the combat with the FARC was, and sometimes more
so because those who turned themselves in brought
information and equipment and motivated others to
demobilize. Well-structured norms and procedures
made the demobilization program clear for all who
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were thinking about abandonment. The program was
supported by a law which strengthened the strategy
and helped in obtaining economic resources. There
were not great offers, but minimal benefits encouraged
many adherents to abandon their illegal groups. Taliban members will have a large number of demands,
but those that are likely to motivate them the most
should be found, granted that they are affordable to
the state. A well-devised demobilization program
would have hundreds of more benefits than any
“body count” strategy. However, military pressure is
part of a demobilization plan. Undoubtedly, the differences between Colombia and Afghanistan are substantial, but some similarities in their environments
are also present. It is clear that the two conflicts are
different, but Colombia’s case offers some good ideas,
and Colombia’s case as a model for a new strategy
for Afghanistan should be a topic for future in-depth
analysis.
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APPENDIX IV. RECONCILIATION TERMS
AND DEFINITIONS
The term “reconciliation” is problematic without
putting it in the context of Afghanistan because the
conflict has changed the dynamics in the country since
2001. This change necessitates an evolved view of reconciliation; the shape its programs must take and the
roles of key actors must be identified.
In 2001, the Bonn Accords referred to the notion
of reconciliation and a parallel political structure
for implementing a politically based, post-conflict
“road map” that included “significant potential to
further a process of reconciliation.”1 In this United
Nations (UN) context, reconciliation was a postconflict political process at the national level.2 Additionally, in the UN Bonn Accords context, reconciliation “was expected to help secure a tentative,
preexisting peace.”3 While this was attractive to the
Afghan Government and the international community based on its context, timeliness, and inclusion,
the context lacked other post-conflict reconciliation
implications, such as altering relationships among the
conflicting parties and citizens to create “a basis for
coexistence.”4
In the current context, reconciliation must account
for previous failures which have impacted the willingness of all parties to enter into negotiations, ongoing
external sponsorship activities from Pakistan, weak
and illegitimate governance, and the realization that
the conflict is ongoing. Reconciliation’s context must
now include how to stop the current fighting and
concurrently “create permanent, peaceful relationships.”5 The shape of the reconciliation programs and
the roles that major actors play create a necessary and
appropriate contemporary definition of reconciliation,
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which will be needed to construct a feasible reconciliation strategy that complements the Trump administration’s South Asia strategy.
Reintegration is the integration of mid- and lowlevel insurgent leaders and their fighters back into
society. Reconciliation implies a negotiated settlement
or political solution among both government and
insurgent senior military and political leaders.
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